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Joseph P. Mastrosimone* 
 
Abstract 
The practice of judges issuing so-called benchslaps is growing both 
in popularity and concern. Such published decisions and orders seek to 
publicly shame lawyers for their alleged unethical or unprofessional 
lawyering. Legal blogs have picked up on this trend, celebrating and 
elevating benchslaps to become a part of legal popular culture. However, 
the practice of using embarrassing and belittling published decisions to 
punish or to deter unethical or professional conduct raises serious 
concerns that the issuing judge is violating his or her own ethical duties. 
This Article criticizes the practice and concludes that it must end 
based on three arguments: (1) benchslaps breach a judge’s ethical 
obligation to take appropriate action in response to attorney misconduct; 
(2) benchslaps by their nature breach a judge’s ethical obligation to treat 
those appearing in court with courtesy, respect, and patience; and (3) the 
lack of appeal rights from a benchslap compounds their 
inappropriateness.   
The Article concludes that we retain the flexibility that judges need 
to manage attorney conduct while eliminating benchslaps as a 
disciplinary method. The Article rejects radical approaches such as 
limiting judicial immunity. Instead, the Article posits that current judicial 
ethical enforcement regimes—properly strengthened—are best equipped 
to address the issue and prevent future benchslaps. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The universal narrative of childhood includes two equally unwholesome 
characters, the bully and the tattletale. Parents wisely counsel their child to be neither 
tattletale nor bully because each comes with costs. It should come as no surprise that 
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bullying’s dangerous use of power against those in weaker positions1 causes the 
bully to lose a sense of compassionate empathy for others.2 Bullies have the ability 
to understand the moral dimensions of their actions, but lack the ability to use that 
knowledge to adjust their behavior.3 The tattletale role comes with its own 
downsides. Parents warn “no one likes a tattletale” for good reason—no one does.4 
Even popular culture makes clear that tattling is the fast lane to losing friends and 
popularity.5    
																																								 																				
1 See Gianluca Gini, Tiziana Pozzoli, & Marc Hauser, Bullies Have Enhanced Moral 
Competence to Judge Relative to Victims, But Lack Moral Compassion, 50 PERSONALITY & 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 603, 604 (2011) (“Moreover, bullying is characterized by an 
imbalance of power between the bully and the victim; the powerful bully intentionally uses 
this inappropriate social behavior to reach valued goals, such as dominance, resource control 
and popularity within a group of peers.”).   
2 Id. 
3 See id. at 607 (“[I]n the same way that recent studies suggest that psychopaths, 
including both adults and adolescents, may know right from wrong, but not care about such 
moral distinctions, so too may bullies have a sophisticated understanding of the moral 
domain without having the requisite emotions to inhibit their aggressive urges.”) (citations 
omitted); Mary C. Lamia, Do Bullies Actually Lack Empathy?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 30, 
2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/intense-emotions-and-strong-feelings/2010 
10/do-bullies-actually-lack-empathy [https://perma.cc/YT4U-ZLHZ] (explaining that while 
bullies have a “capacity to empathize,” they tend to “destructively use their empathy to 
manipulate, control, exploit, or to cause pain. And they are able to withhold their compassion 
for the distress they cause others to feel”). 
4 A recent study of whistleblowing in corporations suggests that employees who 
tattletale (or “blow the whistle”) do not fare well professionally. Alexander Dyck, Adair 
Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FINANCE 2213, 
2240–45 (2010) (stating that 82% of employee whistleblowers were “fired, quit under duress, 
or had significantly altered [employment] responsibilities”). This distaste for tattletales was 
also evident in a study conducted by Ernesto Reuben and Matt Stephenson. See Ernesto 
Reuben & Matt Stephenson, Nobody Likes a Rat: On the Willingness to Report Lies and the 
Consequences Thereof, 93 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 384, 385 (2013) (showing that in an 
emulated organizational setting, groups rarely selected individuals who had a history of 
tattling, and that individuals who had previously reported wrongdoing were generally 
shunned by each group).    
5 Arthur F. Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct, 77 UMKC L. REV. 
537, 545 (2009) [hereinafter Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting] (“In our culture, reporting the 
misconduct of others is regularly frowned upon—who wants to be a ‘snitch’ or a ‘tattle-
tail?’”); John M. Levy, The Judge’s Role in the Enforcement of Ethics—Fear and Learning 
in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 104 (1982) (“In our society the person who 
blows the whistle occupies a very ambiguous position. In common parlance and even in law 
review articles pejorative terms such as ‘squeal,’ ‘rat,’ ‘stool pigeon,’ and ‘gestapo’ are used 
freely. People often say and believe that such action somehow does violence to ‘basic ethical 
notions.’ As a parent one can remember using the devastating ‘put down of, “Don’t be a 
tattle-tale.”’ On the other hand, we give and have been given messages such as ‘Why didn’t 
you tell me that Johnny was . . . ?’”); THE BRADY BUNCH MOVIE (Paramount Pictures 1995) 
(counseling his youngest daughter Cindy, America’s television father, Mike Brady, stated: 
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These twin childhood villains begin to frame a more serious adult problem: 
how are judges expected to manage the conduct of attorneys appearing before them? 
Should a judge reflexively report all, including minor, ethical or professional 
transgressions to the appropriate state bar disciplinary committee? Or, should a 
judge ensure attorney compliance with ethical and professional norms with the force 
of the schoolyard bully by ridiculing and publicly shaming weaker parties into 
compliance? As noted by one author over thirty years ago, the judiciary owns an 
“abysmal” record for reporting attorney misconduct to disciplinary committees.6 In 
the thirty years since, nothing much has changed, as judges continue to preserve 
their own popularity and to avoid taking on the role of the tattletale regarding 
attorney misconduct.7 
Instead, some judges have less trouble adopting the role of the bully. Rather 
than report misconduct, it has become increasingly popular for judges to enforce 
ethical and professional norms through so-called “benchslaps,”8 where the judge, 
often in a way that is superficially humorous, calls out attorney misconduct in a 
written order or opinion. There is some debate as to the cause of this particular type 
of judicial conduct. 9 Yet whatever the cause, it is plain that in each case the judges 
fail to initiate disciplinary action or to counsel the offending attorney quietly. 
																																								 																				
“Cindy, you know by tattling on your friends you’re really just tattling on yourself. By 
tattling on your friends, you’re just telling them that you’re a tattletale. Now is that the tale 
you want to tell?”). 
6 See Levy, supra note 5, at 106 (quoting J. LIBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 203–04 
(1978)) (“[M]any judges, most notably Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, have complained 
that a significant number of advocates who appear before them are 
incompetent . . . . [However,] neither the Chief Justice nor the other judges have forwarded 
the names of obviously unskilled and incompetent lawyers to disciplinary committees for 
appropriate action.”). 
7 See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other 
Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 780 
(1997) (“Moreover, when a judge reports another judge or a lawyer, even one widely 
regarded as acting unethically, others may ‘blame’ the notifying judge, whose status may 
diminish more than that of the reported offender. Understandably, what judge would want 
the reputation of a snitch? Who would want to be a judge?”). 
8 A “benchslap” is formally defined as “a judge’s sharp rebuke of counsel, a litigant, or 
perhaps another judge, esp., a scathing remark from a judge or magistrate to an attorney after 
an objection from opposing counsel has been sustained.” Benchslap, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2011).  
9 See, e.g., Maxine Goodman, Three Likely Causes of Judicial Misbehavior and How 
These Causes Should Inform Judicial Discipline, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 949, 956–68 (2013) 
[hereinafter Goodman, Causes of Judicial Misbehavior] (suggesting judges lose their temper 
for three reasons: a loss of recognition of the humanity of those appearing before the court, 
“decision fatigue,” and the inability to “regulate their emotions”); see Steve Lubet, Stupid 
Judge Tricks, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2000) (suggesting that such “stupid judge 
tricks” are rooted in “an over-active sense of entitlement, verging on self-attributed 
invulnerability”). 
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Instead, judges use public shaming and the power of their position to bully the 
attorney into compliance.10 
The shaming aspect of the benchslap is quite public. Attorneys, law students, 
fellow judges, and anyone with internet access can easily find and guffaw at the 
“Benchslap of the Day” on one legal blog,11 or ring in the New Year by celebrating 
the “Best Benchslaps of [the Year]” on another.12 These legal blogs and their 
celebration of this form of judicial bullying convert attorney discipline from the 
somber and serious correction of professional misconduct into judicial blood sport 
for all to enjoy and cheer on. 
However, once the viewer clicks another link and the laughter dies down, this 
practice raises serious issues regarding the judge’s own ethical and professional 
duties and obligations. Like attorneys, judges too have an ethical obligation to take 
appropriate action when confronted with unethical conduct by lawyers and other 
judges.13 Not only does the practice of correcting attorney misdeeds through a 
benchslap question the benchslapping judge’s ethics,14 it also raises serious concerns 
regarding the slapped attorney’s due process rights because such slaps are generally 
not appealable.15 Beyond that, the indecorous use of the judicial power to mock an 
officer of the court in a written order crosses into unprofessional conduct, further 
eroding the already weakened image of the legal profession and the justice system.   
The analysis that follows makes plain that a judge simply does not and should 
not have the choice to play the bully when disciplining attorneys. Is a judge who 
witnesses attorney misconduct left only with playing the tattletale? The choice 
should not be that stark. Instead, judges must retain the flexibility to manage 
courtroom behavior and the content of attorneys’ written product, while at the same 
time fulfilling their important role in the self-policing of the legal profession of 
which they are an integral part. While the benchslap is under no circumstances an 
appropriate response to attorney misconduct, we need not place the judge in the 
position of “ratting out” attorneys whenever there is a whiff of even minor 
transgressions. Rather, we must trust judges to employ the same common sense that 
																																								 																				
10 See infra Part II.B. 
11 This is a regular feature at the popular legal blog “Above the Law.” Benchslap of the 
Day, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/tag/benchslap-of-the-day/ [https://perma.cc/ 
J937-JD5C]. 
12 Josh Blackman, The 8 Best Benchslaps of 2012, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Dec. 18, 
2012), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/12/18/the-8-best-benchslaps-of-2012/ 
[https://perma.cc/G5ZL-TJHA]. 
13 See Abramson, supra note 7, at 757–59 (showing that Canon 3D of the 1990 Code 
of Judicial Conduct contained ethical obligations imposed on judges who knew of ethical 
violations by judicial officers and lawyers).  
14 See infra Parts III.A., III.B. 
15 See Douglas R. Richmond, Appealing from Judicial Scoldings, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 
741, 757 (2010) (noting that the collateral order doctrine limits the avenues for appeal of 
judicial benchslaps). 
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we entrust them to deploy every day when deciding cases or interacting with litigants 
restrained by stronger guidance from existing judicial ethics codes.   
This Article proposes that it is possible to both restrict the harmful benchslap 
while providing judges with the needed discretion to monitor and correct attorney 
misconduct. Part II of this Article notes the nature of bullying and its foundation in 
the disparate power between bully and victim and explores the effect that bullying 
in workplaces has on both victims and innocent bystanders. This part also explores 
the effects of bullying to the practice of judicial benchslapping, further defines and 
illustrates judicial benchslaps, illuminates the connection between the benchslap and 
attorneys’ breaches of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and drives home how the 
dissemination of benchslaps through legal blogs and social media makes them a 
particularly aggressive form of bullying and an inappropriate method of correcting 
attorney misconduct. Part III offers three separate, but related arguments, concluding 
that the practice of judicial benchslaps is inconsistent with both ethical rules and 
good policy. First, the judicial benchslap represents an abdication of the judge’s duty 
to report attorney misconduct or to take other appropriate action.16 Second, the 
benchslap breaches the judge’s own duty of decorum.17 Third, the benchslap cannot 
be a proper vehicle to mete out attorney discipline because it lacks the necessary due 
process and appeal rights that any system of formal discipline must ensure to be 
just.18  
Part IV recognizes that proposals to limit judicial immunity from defamation 
suits and to expand the opportunity for affected attorneys to appeal judicial 
benchslaps may serve as a deterrent or a safety valve if needed. However, such 
suggestions are ultimately rejected because of the negative effects they would have 
on judicial independence and judicial resources. Instead of such radical reforms, Part 
IV suggests a practical and more modest approach. Because the judicial benchslap 
raises issues of judicial ethics, it is best dealt with through the existing framework 
regulating judicial conduct. Thus, this part ultimately suggests revisions to the 
ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Ethics to make clear that (1) a benchslap is not an 
“appropriate” response to attorney misconduct, while retaining the judge’s ability to 
address less serious infractions of attorney ethics by something less formal than a 
report to the state disciplinary committee, and (2) a benchslap is a violation of a 
judge’s duty to be courteous to lawyers and others appearing before the court. 
  
																																								 																				
16 See infra Part III.A. 
17 See infra Part III.B. 
18 See infra Part III.C. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  The Underbelly of the Slap: The Psychology of Bullying and Its Relation to 
Judicial Benchslaps 
 
“Bullying is aggressive behavior that is intentional and that involves an 
imbalance of power or strength.”19 Importantly, bullying is usually not a random 
act—it is purposeful behavior designed to reach a particular goal.20 In this way, it is 
“premeditated aggression.”21 While it often involves repeated behavior, a single act 
can suffice.22 Bullying has been classified as a “particularly vicious kind of 
aggressive behavior” because the target “is unable to defend himself or herself 
effectively.”23 Bullies can be found in many places—from the schoolyard to the 
work environment like a courtroom.24 Bullies can be most often found in places or 
situations from which the victim can find no escape.25 Yet whether on the 
playground or at work, between children or adults, the general profile of bullies is 
sadly consistent. Bullies are more often men in a position of power vis-à-vis the 
victim of bullying.26  
Over the past two decades, researchers have extensively examined workplace 
bullying and its effects.27 This body of research has revealed that, much like bullying 
																																								 																				
19 ROBIN M. KOWALSKI ET AL., CYBERBULLYING: BULLYING IN THE DIGITAL AGE, at 
18 (2d ed. 2012) (citations omitted). 
20 See Gini, Pozzoli, & Hauser, supra note 1, at 604 (asserting that bullying “is more 
goal-oriented than reactive aggression”).  
21 Id. 
22 See Anthony Carlino, The Counsellor’s Column, POLARE, Oct. 2012, at 21 (noting 
that “even a single act can be bullying and have a massively detrimental effect to someone’s 
mental health”).  
23 PETER K. SMITH, THE NATURE OF SCHOOL BULLYING: A CROSS-NATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 1 (1999). 
24 See Gini, Pozzoli, & Hauser, supra note 1, at 604 (studying bullying in school-aged 
children); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for 
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 478–79 (2000) 
[hereinafter Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying”] (studying bullying among 
adults at work). 
25 SMITH, supra note 23, at 1. 
26 See Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying,” supra note 24, at 481 
(noting that in one study 70% of the “instigators were male, men were much more likely than 
women to inflict their actions on those of lower status”). 
27 The term “workplace bullying” was coined by British journalist Andrea Adams in 
the 1980s and early 1990s when she used a series of BBC radio documentaries to bring the 
topic to a more public audience. See David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American 
Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 
J. 251, 254 (2010). Although definitions vary, workplace bullying is commonly defined as 
“repeated, unreasonable actions of individuals (or a group) directed towards an employee (or 
a group of employees), which are intended to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, or undermine, 
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in childhood, there are significant and adverse consequences associated with 
workplace bullying.28 These consequences affect not only the individual target, but 
also their peers and the larger profession as well.29 At the individual level, the 
consequences range from minor physical and mental health issues to severe 
psychological disorders and physiological side effects.30 At the organizational level, 
the resulting consequences can include anything from high turnover to a general lack 
of commitment to the profession.31 
The personalized, focused nature of bullying, often compromises a target’s 
mental health.32 The bullying behavior destabilizes and disassembles the target’s 
identity and sense of justice and fairness, creating insecurities and feelings of loss 
and helplessness.33 In addition, bullying causes targets to experience shame, guilt, 
embarrassment, and low self-esteem.34 These emotions often compound, and may 
result in psychological distress, including anxiety, depression, negative emotions, 
																																								 																				
or which create a risk to the health or safety of the employee.” SAFETY & HEALTH 
ASSESSMENT & RESEARCH FOR PREVENTION (SHARP) PROGRAM, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF 
LABOR & INDUS., REPORT NO. 87-2-2011, WORKPLACE BULLYING AND DISRUPTIVE 
BEHAVIOR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 (2011).   
28 See Randy A. Sansone & Lori A. Sansone, Workplace Bullying: A Tale of Adverse 
Consequences, 12 INNOVATIONS CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 32, 34–35 (2015). 
29 See id.  
30 See id.  
31 See Charlotte Rayner, The Incidence of Workplace Bullying, 7 J. COMMUNITY & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 199, 207–08 (1997); see also Yamada, The Phenomenon of 
“Workplace Bullying,” supra note 24, at 483–84.  
32 See Morten Birkeland Nielsen et al., Longitudinal Relationship Between Workplace 
Bullying and Psychological Distress, 38 SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK ENV’T & HEALTH 38, 38 
(2012). 
33 Id. (likening the experience of workplace bullying to a traumatic event); see Annie 
Hogh et al., Individual Consequences of Workplace Bullying/Mobbing, in BULLYING AND 
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 
115 (Ståle Einarsen et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). A traumatic event is an event that is so 
overwhelming that the individual feels unable to function without substantial help from 
others, and can threaten to shatter basic cognitive schemas. Id. This process is further 
explained by examination of Janoff-Bulman’s theory of cognitive trauma. According to this 
theory, “psychological problems following victimization are caused by the shattering of 
basic assumptions targets of bullying hold of themselves, other people, and the world.” 
Nielsen et al., supra note 32, at 42. Thus, exposure to workplace bullying “is assumed to 
shatter the target’s basic beliefs in justice and fairness, creating a state of anxiety and feelings 
of loss that subsequently have consequences on mental health.” Id. 
34 See GARY NAMIE ET AL., BULLYPROOF YOURSELF AT WORK!: PERSONAL 
STRATEGIES TO STOP THE HURT FROM HARASSMENT 69 (1999); see also HARVEY A. 
HORNSTEIN, BRUTAL BOSSES AND THEIR PREY 74–75 (1996) (showing statistically 
significant correlations between a “boss’s abusive disrespect” and depression, anxiety, and 
low self-esteem).  
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and overt anger.35 This distress is heightened in workplace environments, where 
power structures are particularly apparent.36 
When these behavioral stressors go unabated, a target’s mental health can 
further deteriorate and, in some cases, even result in severe psychological disorders 
and work-related suicide.37 In fact, several researchers have suggested that targets of 
workplace bullying experience symptoms similar to those associated with 
posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).38 One study in particular found that victims 
of bullying exhibited higher levels of PTSD than a series of nonbullied, high-trauma 
control groups, including recently divorced persons and war zone personnel.39 While 
these are extreme cases, there is no question that there are serious adverse mental 
health consequences for victims of bullying.  
																																								 																				
35 See Karl Aquino et al., Overt Anger in Response to Victimization: Attributional Style 
and Organizational Norms as Moderators, 9 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 152, 160 
(2004) (finding a strong relationship between perceived victimization at the workplace and 
overt anger); Åse Marie Hansen et al., Bullying at Work, Health Outcomes, and 
Physiological Stress Response, 60 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 63, 67–69 (2006) (noting 
a statistically significant association between bullying and anxiety and depression); Lars 
Johan Hauge et al., The Relative Impact of Workplace Bullying as a Social Stressor at Work, 
51 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOLOGY 426, 429–30 (2010) (finding a strong correlation between 
workplace bullying and anxiety and depression); Tina Løkke Vie et al., How Does It Feel? 
Workplace Bullying, Emotions and Musculoskeletal Complaints, 53 SCANDINAVIAN J. 
PSYCHOLOGY 165, 170 (2012) (concluding that victims of bullying “tend to be more afraid, 
upset, angry, guilty, nervous, hostile, frustrated, ashamed, scared and stressed than non-
victims”). 
36 See Sara Branch et al., Workplace Bullying, Mobbing and General Harassment: A 
Review, 15 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 280, 282 (2013); see also Kathleen Conn, Best Practices 
in Bullying Prevention: One Size Does Not Fit All, 22 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 393, 396 
(2013) (noting that one of the defining characteristics that differentiates bullying from more 
general forms of violence is the imbalance of power).  
37 See Stig Berge Matthiesen & Ståle Einarsen, Psychiatric Distress and Symptoms of 
PTSD Among Victims of Bullying at Work, 32 BRITISH J. GUIDANCE & COUNSELLING 335, 
338 (2004); see also Virginia Hazel Routley & Joan E. Ozanne-Smith, Work-Related Suicide 
in Victoria, Australia: A Broad Perspective, 19 INT’L J. INJ. CONTROL & SAFETY PROMOTION 
131, 132 (2012) (noting that of the 642 work-related suicides examined in the study, 55% 
had an association with work stressors such as workplace bullying). Joseph Kinney, founding 
director of the nonprofit National Safe Workplace Institute, also found that workplace 
violence can be a consequence of abusive work environments, noting that “there have been 
numerous instances where abusive supervisors have baited angry and frustrated employees, 
pushing these individuals to unacceptable levels of violence and aggression.” JOSEPH A. 
KINNEY, VIOLENCE AT WORK: HOW TO MAKE YOUR COMPANY SAFER FOR EMPLOYEES & 
CUSTOMERS 132 (1995). 
38 See Matthiesen & Einarsen, supra note 37, at 338; see also Claire Bonafons et al., 
Specificity of the Links Between Workplace Harassment and PTSD: Primary Results Using 
Court Decisions, a Pilot Study in France, INT’L ARCHIVE OCCUPATIONAL ENV’T HEALTH 
663, 665 (2009).  
39 Matthiesen & Einarsen, supra note 37, at 342–45.  
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In addition to these mental health concerns, a lengthy list of physical side 
effects is also associated with workplace bullying.40 Recent research has linked the 
experience of bullying to physiological outcomes, such as sleep problems, 
musculoskeletal complaints, lower salivary cortisol, and cardiovascular disease.41 
Additional physical effects include reduced immunity to infection, stress headaches, 
high blood pressure, and digestive problems.42 
Interestingly, the consequences are not limited to the individual targets 
themselves. Studies have found that witnesses also experience negative reactions to 
workplace bullying, such as lower general and mental stress and emotional drain.43 
In addition, the vicarious experience of bullying may create feelings of fear and 
depression.44 Many coworkers and peers who witness workplace bullying can 
invoke a strong sense of guilt that can erode confidence over time.45  
Unsurprisingly, the combination of these physiological and psychological 
effects often results in broader consequences, such as an increase in absenteeism, as 
targets report higher levels of burnout and emotional exhaustion.46 Concerns 
																																								 																				
40 See Sansone & Sansone, supra note 28, at 34–35.  
41 See Hansen et al., supra note 35, at 69 (finding that bullied participants had a 30% 
lower cortisol concentration in the saliva); M. Kivimäki et al., Workplace Bullying and the 
Risk of Cardiovascular Disease and Depression, 60 J. OCCUPATION & ENVTL. MED. 779, 
780 (2003) (noting that, with regard to cardiovascular disease, the odds ratio for bullied 
participants compared to non-bullied counterparts was 2.3); Isabelle Niedhammer et al., 
Workplace Bullying and Sleep Disturbances: Findings from a Large Scale Cross-Sectional 
Survey in the French Working Population, 32 SLEEP 1211, 1213–14 (2009) (finding that 
sleep disturbances are prevalent among individuals exposed to workplace bullying); Vie et 
al., supra note 35, at 169 (noting a positive correlation between exposure to workplace 
bullying and musculoskeletal complaints).  
42 See NAMIE ET AL., supra note 34, at 69.  
43 Maarit A-L Vartia, Consequences of Workplace Bullying with Respect to the Well-
Being of Its Targets and the Observers of Bullying, 27 SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK ENV’T. & 
HEALTH 63, 65 (2001) (noting that “observers of bullying . . . reported significantly more 
general stress and mental stress reactions than did the employees from workplaces without 
bullying”); Peter Totterdell et al., Can Employees Be Emotionally Drained by Witnessing 
Unpleasant Interactions Between Coworkers? A Diary Study of Induced Emotion 
Regulation, 26 WORK & STRESS 112, 126–27 (2012) (concluding that staff felt significantly 
more emotionally drained after witnessing workplace bullying).  




46 See Paolo Campanini et al., Rischio Mobbing e Assenze Lavorative per Malattia 
[Workplace Bullying and Sickness Absenteeism], 37 EPIDEMIOLOGIA E PREVENZIONE 
[EPIDEMIOLOGY & PREVENTION] 8, 8–16 (2013) (It.) (confirming that workers exposed to 
workplace bullying report higher sickness absenteeism as compared to non-exposed 
participants); M. Voss et al., Physical, Psychosocial, and Organisational Factors Relative 
to Sickness Absence: A Study Based on Sweden Post, 58 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 
178, 181 (2001) (noting that the occurrence of bullying at the workplace almost doubled the 
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regarding turnover are also prevalent, with some studies suggesting that one in four 
people leave their organizations because of workplace bullying.47 Perhaps most 
devastating, however, is the fact that workplace environments conducive to bullying 
create “fear and mistrust, resentment, hostility, feelings of humiliation, withdrawal, 
play-it-safe strategies, and hiding mistakes.”48 As David Yamada noted, an 
atmosphere “infected with [these attitudes]” often results in stress that “stifle[s] 
creativity,” commitment to quality, and respect for the overall profession.49 
The documented research demonstrates that exposure to bullying, particularly 
in one’s workspace, has a corrosive effect not only on the direct victim but on others 
around him or her.50 If we consider the courtroom and the court’s written orders and 
decisions as part of a lawyer’s workspace, the effect of the judicial benchslap 
expands far beyond simply the judge and the lawyer to whom it is directed. It infects 
all of those interacting with the court—parties, lawyers, staff, etc. And those effects 
appear to be far beyond hurt feelings as discussed above. We should seriously 
consider why we would tolerate anything that would stifle creativity, reduce 
commitments to quality, and erode respect for the profession. 
 
B.  The Nature of the Slap: Benchslaps Defined and Illustrated 
 
Coined in 2005, the term “benchslap” is a recent addition to legal vocabulary.51 
As defined, it is a “judge’s sharp rebuke of counsel, a litigant, or perhaps another 
judge.”52 The term is derived from the offensive term “bitch-slap.”53 To “bitch-slap” 
someone is to “slap (someone) angrily usually as an expression of dominance, 
																																								 																				
risk of high incidences of sickness); Tsung-Yu Wu & Changya Hu, Abusive Supervision and 
Employee Emotional Exhaustion: Dispositional Antecedents and Boundaries, 34 GROUP & 
ORG. MGMT. 143, 151 (2009) (noting a positive correlation between abusive supervision and 
emotional exhaustion). Concerns of high turnover as a result of workplace bullying are also 
quite prevalent. Id. at 145. 
47 See Rayner, supra note 31, at 204. 
48 EMILY S. BASSMAN, ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE: MANAGEMENT REMEDIES AND 
BOTTOM LINE IMPACT 141 (1992). 
49 See Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying,” supra note 24, at 483–84.  
50 In fact, the potential damage from bullying can reach beyond the tight circle of those 
who know the perpetrator and victim. See Abigail A. Patthoff, This Is Your Brain on Law 
School: The Impact of Fear-Based Narratives on Law Students, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 391, 
393–94 (2015) (arguing that the use of benchslaps in law school to scare students into later 
ethical and professional practice is likely to backfire. Because law school is a “‘breeding 
ground’ for anxiety and law student distress,” the use of such “fear-based narratives” could 
cause students to “react in perverse ways in response to fear appeals.”).  
51 Benchslap, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2010) (noting that the term was 
coined by “Above the Law” creator and legal blogger David Lat in 2005); Benchslaps, 
ABOVE THE LAW http://abovethelaw.com/benchslaps/ [https://perma.cc/KG3L-WU36]. 
52 Benchslap, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2010). 
53 Id. (noting that the term is “an echo of the offensive and derogatory term bitch-slap”). 
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contempt, or disrespect.”54 The online Urban Dictionary’s definition likewise 
reflects the intent to dominate the recipient of such a slap.55 Given that pedigree, the 
“benchslap” certainly connotes the judge’s attempt to dominate and bully the 
recipient of the rebuke. It is this thinly veiled attempt to demean and belittle that sets 
apart the true benchslap from the more routine business of the court managing 
attorney behavior.  
The rising popularity of the benchslap has led to the creation of a modern 
taxonomy of slaps. Developed by legal blogger Josh Blackman, benchslaps are 
broken down into five distinct categories. A “horizontal bench slap” is a slap 
directed at a judge on the same level or court as the slapping judge.56 Of course, the 
“vertical bench slap” is directed at a lower-court judge.57 Its opposite is the “reverse 
bench slap,” where a lower-court judge benchslaps a judge on a higher court.58 A 
																																								 																				
54 Bitch-Slap, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/bitch%E2%80%93slap [https://perma.cc/3EZA-XYL7].   
55 Bitch-slap, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term 
=bitch%20slap [https://perma.cc/TW8X-NSC8] (noting that the top definition states that the 
act’s purpose is to “[d]enote disrespect for the person being bitch slapped as they are not 
worthy of a man sized punch. Suggests the slap was met with little resistance and much 
whining.”). 
56 Blackman, supra note 12 (“The [term] horizontal benchslap refers to a judicial 
remark that smacks down a fellow judge on the same court.”). In a footnote in the majority 
opinion in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, Justice Richard N. Palmer of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court attacks fellow Justice Carmen E. Espinosa for her dissenting 
opinion, where she purportedly misinterprets the meaning of habeas corpus: 
 
Rather than support her opinion with legal analysis and authority, however, 
[Justice Espinosa] chooses, for reasons we cannot fathom, to dress her argument 
in language so derisive that it is unbefitting an opinion of this state’s highest court. 
Perhaps worse, her interest lies only in launching groundless ad hominem attacks 
and in claiming to be able to divine that (allegedly improper) personal motivations 
of the majority. We will not respond in kind to Justice Espinosa’s offensive 
accusations; we are content, instead, to rely on the merits of our analysis of the 
issues presented by this appeal. Unfortunately, in taking a different path, Justice 
Espinosa dishonors this court. 
 
Lapointe v. Comm’r of Corr., 112 A.2d 1, 59 n.69 (Conn. 2015). 
57 Blackman, supra note 12 (“The vertical benchslap refers to a judicial remark that 
smacks down a judge on a lower court.”). After Judge Posner questioned Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Arizona v. United States, Justice Scalia “benchslapped” back in an interview with 
Fox News Sunday: “‘He’s a court of appeals judge, isn’t he?’ Scalia, 76, said of Posner. ‘He 
doesn’t sit in judgment of my opinions as far as I’m concerned.’” Benchslap of the Day: 
Justice Scalia Pulls Rank on Judge Posner, ABOVE THE LAW (July 30, 2012, 4:48 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2012/07/benchslap-of-the-day-justice-scalia-pulls-rank-on-judge-
posner/ [https://perma.cc/KS2A-VZPP]. 
58 Blackman, supra note 12 (“The reverse benchslap (as coined by David Lat) refers to 
‘a lower-court judge dissing a judge on a higher tribunal.’”). In a piece for Slate, federal 
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particularly severe benchslap is the “GVRtical Bench Slap,” where the U.S. 
Supreme Court specifically refers to a court of appeals by name in a “Grant-Vacate-
Remand . . . per curium order.”59 Finally, the “Flying Bench Slap” includes situations 
where the judge issues a benchslap to the litigants in a particular case—flying off 
the bench “to deliver a personal slap to the litigant.”60 It is the final category of 
																																								 																				
appeals court Judge Posner penned a scathing criticism of the dissenting Justices in 
Obergefell: 
 
The four dissents strike me as very weak, though I’ll discuss just two of them, 
beginning with the chief justice’s. . . .  
The chief justice criticizes the majority for “order[ing] the transformation of 
a social institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for 
the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. 
Just who do we think we are?” We’re pretty sure we’re not any of the above. And 
most of us are not convinced that what’s good enough for the Bushmen, the 
Carthaginians, and the Aztecs should be good enough for us. Ah, the millennia! 
Ah, the wisdom of ages! How arrogant it would be to think we knew more than 
the Aztecs—we who don’t even know how to cut a person’s heart out of his chest 
while he’s still alive, a maneuver they were experts at. 
 
Richard A. Posner, Supreme Court Breakfast Table: The Chief Justice’s Dissent Is Heartless, 
SLATE (June 27, 2015, 1:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_ 
breakfast_table/features/2015/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_gay_marriage_john_roberts_
dissent_in_obergefell_is_heartless.html [https://perma.cc/G2A3-V456]. 
59 Blackman, supra note 12 (“The most severe of all vertical benchslaps is when 
SCOTUS calls out a court of appeals by name in a Grant-Vacate-Remand (GVR in the lingo) 
per curium order. This is the dreaded GVRtical benchslap (pronounced Go Vertical).”). The 
United States Supreme Court, in Parker v. Matthews, repeatedly called out the Sixth Circuit 
in their Grant-Vacate-Remand per curium order: 
 
As we explained in correcting an identical error by the Sixth Circuit two 
Terms ago . . . circuit precedent does not constitute “clearly established Federal 
law, as determine by the Supreme Court.” It therefore cannot form the basis for 
habeas relief under AEDPA. Nor can the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on its own 
precedents be defended in this case on the ground that they merely reflect what 
has been “clearly established” by our cases. The highly generalized standard for 
evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct set forth in Darden bears scant 
resemblance to the elaborate, multistep test employed by the Sixth Circuit here. 
To make matters worse, the Sixth Circuit decided Gall II under pre-AEDPA 
law . . . so that case did not even purport to reflect clearly established law as set 
out in this Court’s holdings. It was plain and repetitive error for the Sixth Circuit 
to rely on its own precedents in granting Matthews habeas relief.  
 
Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155–56 (2012). 
60 Blackman, supra note 12 (“Yet, the benchslap is not only used to smack down other 
judges. Frequently, it is used to smack down litigants who mess up. In such cases, the Judge 
flies off the bench to deliver a personal slap to the litigant. This is the flying benchslap.”). 
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benchslaps—those directed not towards other judges but to lawyers appearing before 
the judge—that raise the concerns addressed in this Article. While the intrajudicial 
benchslaps raise concerns,61 it is the ones directed towards nonjudges where issues 
of decorum, ethical obligations, and public perception are particularly pronounced. 
Moreover, the extrajudicial slap represents the clearest case of judicial bullying—
where one party is prevented from responding in kind even if so inclined.62 Thus, 
while there are certainly arguments against benchslaps in all of their forms, the 
analysis that follows focuses exclusively on the flying benchslap (and will use the 
generic term “benchslap” to refer to that subset). 
Not every order or decision noting an attorney’s performance is properly 
classified as a benchslap. Merely pointing out potential misconduct is not enough. 
Two examples nicely illustrate judicial condemnation of poor attorney performance 
without benchslapping the attorneys involved. 
In Cottonwood Financial v. Estes,63 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals took the 
time to sanction an attorney $150 for failing to comply with the rules of appellate 
procedure while deciding the merits of the case without issuing a caustic 
benchslap.64 The court noted that the attorney failed “to provide proper citation to 
the appellate record or to the relevant case law” and included an inappropriately 
lengthy 230-page appendix consisting of nearly the entire appellate record.65 The 
court “seeing as [it was] already expending judicial resources explaining how Estes 
wasted judicial resources in this appeal,” went on to criticize the attorney for the 
unwise decision to reply to the defendant’s brief by filing a letter standing on the 
argument in the initial briefing.66   
Likewise, the California Court of Appeal took on a particularly bad case of 
unprofessional and unethical conduct in In re S.C.67 There, the court was faced with 
a truly incompetent and quite offensive brief in which counsel, during the course of 
																																								 																				
61 While the other forms of benchslaps certainly raise questions about their 
inappropriateness, at least in many the power imbalance and bullying seen in the “flying 
benchslap” are not present or are not as problematic. Certainly, the spectacle of life-tenured 
federal and state court judges lowering themselves and their offices by engaging in such 
unprofessional behavior raises many of the concerns about judicial decorum and the public’s 
perception of the justice system addressed below. However, I leave to another article or 
another author to more fully analyze the appropriateness of such intra-judicial benchslaps. 
62 See infra Part III.B. While ill-advised, parties themselves are not immune from the 
temptation to slap back occasionally. Thus, one pro se litigant filed a Notice of Appeal in 
which he informed the court that he was “appealing the asshole Ronald B. Leighton’s 
decision in this matter. You have been hereby serve[d] [sic] notice. You’re not getting away 
with this shit that easy.” Swinyer v. Cole, Case 3:04-cv-05348-RBL, 100 (W.D. Wash. July 
12, 2006). 
63 784 N.W.2d 726 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 337 Wis.2d 49 
(2011). 
64 Id. at 729. 
65 Id. at 735. 
66 Id. 
67 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
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over 76,000 words, “gratuitously and wrongly insult[ed] her client’s daughter (the 
minor in this case) by, among other things, stating the girl’s developmental 
disabilities make her ‘more akin to broccoli.’”68 The opening lines of the published 
decision reflects the court’s clear frustration with the offending attorney: 
 
This is an appeal run amok. Not only does the appeal lack merit, the 
opening brief is a textbook example of what an appellate brief should not 
be. 
In 76,235 words, rambling and ranting over the opening brief’s 202 
pages, appellant’s counsel has managed to violate rules of court; ignore 
standards of review; misrepresent the record; base arguments on matters 
not in the record on appeal; fail to support arguments with any meaningful 
analysis and citation to authority; raise an issue that is not cognizable in 
an appeal by her client; unjustly challenge the integrity of the opposing 
counsel; make a contemptuous attack on the trial judge; and present claims 
of error in other ways that are contrary to commonsense notions of 
effective appellate advocacy . . . .69 
 
The court noted that its “comments are harsh but deservedly so.”70 The remainder of 
the opinion is a mix of merits determinations and criticisms of the lawyering in the 
case. Thus, the court was “mystified as to how appellant’s counsel believes the 
record citations support the claim of error,”71 noted that counsel “fails to grasp” a 
fundamental rule of appellate review,72 and labeled counsel’s advocacy as “uncivil, 
unprofessional, and offensive.”73 The court concluded its opinion with an order that 
its decision be sent to the state bar. 74 
In neither example did the court employ rhetoric that would bully or demean 
the attorneys in question. Instead, both decisions frankly state the attorneys’ failings 
without demeaning them. Such professional recitation of the attorneys’ ethical 
lapses stands in stark contrast to the demeaning, belittling, and bullying benchslaps. 
																																								 																				
68 Id. at 458. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 459. 
71 Id. at 467. 
72 Id. at 470. 
73 Id. at 474. 
74 Id. at 479 (“Upon issuance of the remittitur, the Clerk/Administrator of this court is 
directed to send a copy of this opinion to the State Bar of California.”). The propriety of 
judges using a written order to recited alleged attorney failings and sending that order to a 
state bar for investigation and potential sanction is beyond the scope of this Article. On one 
hand, if done professionally, such an order would not raise the problems associated with 
benchslaps. On the other, such public accusations, even if proven false, can have a long last 
effect on the accused attorney’s reputation. This would counsel for a less public reporting 
instrument. 
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While the term “benchslap” is a relative newcomer to legal vocabulary, the act 
of a judge using his or her position of power to demean a lawyer in writing dates 
back hundreds of years.75 In what may be the first benchslap in recorded history, a 
London judge in 1596 took a lawyer to task for filing a pleading that, in the judge’s 
opinion, was significantly over length.76 The court noted that the plaintiff’s 
“replication”77 amounted to “six score sheets of paper,” but could have been “well 
contrived in sixteen sheets of paper.”78 The court took to the task of discovering the 
author of this verbose pleading so that “for example sake” he could be punished and 
fined.79 The author confessed to drafting the pleading, and the court took him into 
custody, imposed a fine, and ordered costs to the defendant.80 As if being taken into 
custody was insufficient, the court went a step beyond and benchslapped the 
offender by ordering that a hole be cut “in the myddest” of the pleading and that the 
offender wear the pleading (“with the written side outward”) while being shown, 
“bare headed and bare faced,” to the courts sitting within Westminster Hall.81   
Modern benchslaps lack the Elizabethan English, but contain the same 
elements of mockery and public shaming. One of the more famous benchslaps, 
making a yearly appearance in legal writing classes across the nation, is Bradshaw 
v. Unity Marine Corp.82 In that case, former Federal District Court Judge Kent,83 
benchslapped both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s attorneys while granting summary 
judgement for the defendant on a personal injury claim.84 The resolution of the 
matter hinged on whether state law or federal maritime law applied to the claim 
because of the differing statutes of limitation.85 While the issue was rather 
																																								 																				
75 Judith D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to 
Unprofessionalism in Lawyers’ Papers, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1997); Judith D. 
Fischer, Incivility in Lawyers’ Writing: Judicial Handling of Rambo Run Amok, 50 
WASHBURN L.J. 365, 367 (2011). 
76 Mylward v. Weldon, [1595] EWHC Ch. 1, Reg. Lib. A. 1596, Fol. 672 (15 Feb., 
1595).  
77 A replication is a common law pleading in which the plaintiff replies to the 
defendant’s answer. Replication, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
78 Mylward v. Weldon, [1595] EWHC Ch. 1, Reg. Lib. A. 1596, Fol. 672 (15 Feb., 
1595). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. The court ordered the plaintiff to be held prisoner until he pay ten pounds as a 
fine and twenty nobles to the defendant as costs. Id.  
81 Id. 
82 147 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex.). 
83 It should be noted that former Judge Kent was impeached by the U.S. House of 
Representatives in June 2009 and is currently serving a prison sentence for lying to 
investigators during an investigation of allegations that he sexually assaulted two female 
employees. S.A. Miller, Impeached Judge Samuel B. Kent Tenders His Resignation, WASH. 
TIMES (June 27, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/27/impeached-
judge-tenders-his-resignation/ [https://perma.cc/54FJ-S99S]. 
84 Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 672. 
85 Id. at 671. 
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straightforward, the parties’ briefings were deficient in many respects. The third 
paragraph of the published order begins the court’s screed of the lawyering in the 
case: 
 
Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case involves two 
extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered some of the most 
amateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, 
an effort which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible explanation. 
Both attorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact—complete with 
hats, handshakes and cryptic words—to draft their pleadings entirely in 
crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope 
that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like efforts that their 
utter dearth of legal authorities in their briefing would go unnoticed. 
Whatever actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the daunting task 
of deciphering their submissions. With Big Chief tablet readied, thick 
black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care laugh in the face of death, life 
on the razor’s edge sense of exhilaration, the Court begins.86 
 
After setting forth the summary judgment standard, the court continued to 
openly mock the lawyers in the case. The court accused defendant’s counsel of 
beginning the case’s “descent into Alice’s Wonderland” through his “bumbling 
approach” of relying on only one case and failing to cite to the statute of limitation.87 
In the court’s view, the plaintiff’s counsel’s own “gossamer wisp of an argument” 
was no better, although he does get credit for citing to the federal statute of 
limitations.88 The court noted that the plaintiff also cited to only one case, but the 
citation in the brief referred to a nonexistent volume of the federal reporter.89 After 
locating the case, the court noted that it stood “for the bombshell proposition that 
torts committed on navigable waters . . . require the application of general maritime 
rather than state tort law.”90 Referring to that case, the court went on: “(What 
the . . .)?! The Court cannot even begin to comprehend why this case was selected 
for reference. It is almost as if Plaintiff’s counsel chose the opinion by throwing long 
range darts at the Federal Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a nonexistent 
																																								 																				
86 Id. at 670. 
87 Id. (“Defendant begins the descent into Alice’s Wonderland by submitting a Motion 
that relies upon only one legal authority. . . . A more bumbling approach is difficult to 
conceive––but wait folks, There’s More!”). 
88 Id. (“Plaintiff responds to this deft, yet minimalist analytical wizardry with an equally 
gossamer wisp of an argument, although Plaintiff does at least cite the federal limitations 
provision applicable to maritime tort claims.”). 
89 Id. at 670–71 (“Plaintiff ‘cites’ to a single case from the Fourth Circuit. Plaintiff’s 
citation, however, points to a nonexistent Volume ‘1886’ of the Federal Reporter Third 
Edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation for what, after being located, turned out 
to be a forty-page decision.”). 
90 Id. at 671. 
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volume!).”91 The remainder of the decision is filled with similar language openly 
mocking the lawyers for their failure to adequately inform the court of the applicable 
law and authorities, suggesting that the parties’ briefs were written with crayon.92 
In another benchslap, Federal District Court Judge Sam Sparks invited counsel 
to a “kindergarten party” to discuss the pending motion to quash subpoenas filed by 
three nonparties.93 The order noted: 
 
The party will feature many exciting and informative lessons, including: 
• How to telephone and communicate with a lawyer 
• How to enter into reasonable agreements about deposition dates 
• How to limit depositions to reasonable subject matter 
• Why it is neither cute nor clever to attempt to quash a subpoena for 
technical failures of service when notice is reasonably given; and 
• An advanced seminar on not wasting the time of a busy federal judge 
and his staff because you are unable to practice law at the level of a first-
year law student. 
Invitation to this exclusive event is not RSVP. Please remember to bring a 
sack lunch! The United States Marshals have beds available if necessary, 
so you may wish to bring a toothbrush in case the party runs late.94 
 
Judge Sparks has lamented in at least one other case that the litigants in his cases 
behaved like kindergarten children.95 His benchslapping ways, while not leading to 
																																								 																				
91 Id.  
92 Id. In a particular passage worth noting, the court stated: 
 
Despite the continued shortcomings of Plaintiff’s supplemental submission, the 
Court commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved choice of crayon––Brick Red 
is much easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better amidst the 
mustard splotched about Plaintiff’s briefing. But at the end of the day, even if you 
put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig. Id.  
 
93 Morris v. Coker, No. A-11-MC-712-SS, 2011 WL 3847590, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 
26, 2011). 
94 Id.  
95 In Klein-Becker, LLC v. Stanley, No. A-03-CA-871-SS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19107 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2004), Judge Sparks lamented: 
 
When the undersigned accepted the appointment from the President of the 
United States of the position now held, he was ready to face the daily practice of 
law in federal courts with presumably competent lawyers. No one warned the 
undersigned that in many instances his responsibility would be the same as a 
person who supervised kindergarten. Frankly, the undersigned would guess the 
lawyers in this case did not attend kindergarten as they never learned how to get 
along well with others. . . . 
348 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
formal discipline, have not gone unnoticed. In response to the kindergarten 
benchslap, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Edith Jones sent Judge Sparks 
an email suggesting that his “cute” orders are doing more harm than good and 
reflecting “badly on all of us.”96 Other courts have taken lawyers to task in written 
orders for failing to play nicely with others during the litigation process.97 
																																								 																				
The Court simply wants to scream to these lawyers, “Get a life” or “Do you 
have any other cases?” or “When is the last time you registered for an anger 
management class?” 
 
Id. at *4–6. 
96 MATTHEW A. BOWERS, BENCHSLAPPED: PUBLICLY HUMILIATING JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS 227 (2d. ed. 2013). The email in question, which was intended to be private but so 




It has not escaped my attention, or that of my colleagues or, I am told, 
nationally known blog sites that you have issued several “cute” orders in the past 
few weeks. The order attached below is the most recent. 
Frankly, this kind of rhetoric is not funny. In fact, it is so caustic, demeaning, 
and gratuitous that it casts more disrespect on the judiciary than on the now-
besmirched reputation of the counsel. It suggests either that the judge is simply 
indulging himself at the expense of counsel or that he is fighting with counsel in 
what, as Judge Gee used to say, is surely not a fair contest. 
No doubt, none of us has been consistently above reproach in our 
professional communications with counsel. We are all prone to human error. But 
no judge who writes an order should allow such rhetoric to overcome common 
sense.  
Ultimately, this kind of excess, as I noted, reflects badly on all of us. I urge 






97 See, e.g., Rulings on Pending Motions at 2–4, Physicians Choice of Ariz. v. Miller, 
No. CV2003-020242, (Ariz. Sup. Ct. July 19, 2006) (granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 
Attendance of Lunch Invitation, listing the parties’ squabbles over the location and timing, 
allocating the cost and tip, and suggesting that “serious discussion occur after counsel have 
eaten. The temperaments of the Court’s children always improve after a meal.”); Order on 
Motion to Continue at 1–3, Jayhawk Capital Mgmt., LLC v. LSB Indus., Inc., No. 08-2561-
EFM, 2011 WL 1626581 (D. Kan. April 12, 2011) (granting a contested motion to continue 
where one of the plaintiff’s counsel’s wife was expecting a child during the scheduled trial 
and noted that this case represented an “uncommon example” of the “unhappy trend” of 
“attorneys los[ing] sight of their role as professionals, and personaliz[ing] the dispute; 
converting the parties’ disagreement into a lawyer’s spat.” The court noted the “importance 
of federal court,” but also that he “ha[d] always tried not to confuse what he does with who 
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Another trial-level benchslap began as a verbal assault on a lawyer and 
eventually morphed into a highly insulting written order.98 U.S. District Court Judge 
Lynn Hughes had been presiding over a federal prosecution of an alleged terrorist in 
United States v. Hardan.99 Texas-based assistant U.S. attorneys handled the case 
exclusively until Assistant U.S. Attorney Kashyap Patel, a prosecutor with the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s National Security Division in Washington, D.C., was 
assigned to oversee the case.100 Mr. Patel’s first meeting with Judge Hughes did not 
go well.101 Before they even met, Judge Hughes referred to Mr. Patel as a “son of 
[a] bitch[]” in advising the Texas-based lawyers that they should not have let Mr. 
Patel use their PACER account to file his notice of appearance.102 From the tenor of 
the conversation, it seems that it was the presence of Washington, D.C. lawyers that 
got under Judge Hughes’s skin.103 Once the two met, things did not improve. Judge 
Hughes berated Mr. Patel for failing to wear a tie, even after he explained that he 
had arrived directly to the courthouse from an international flight through 
Tajikistan.104 Judge Hughes then berated Mr. Patel for his presence in the case, 
concluding that he did not “add a bit of value” over the Texas-based lawyers.105 
																																								 																				
he is, nor to distort the priorities of his day job with his life’s role.” The court concluded 
with: “Counsel are encouraged to order their priorities similarly.”). 
98 See Order on Ineptitude, United States v. Al Hardan, No. H-16-CR-003 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 5, 2016) (Docket Document 45).  
99 See id. 
100 Adam Goldman, ‘You Don’t Add a Bit of Value, Do You?’: Texas Judge Berates 




101 Mr. Patel’s first few seconds of his meeting with Judge Hughes set the tone: 
 
THE COURT: What is your role in this? 
MR. PATEL: I’m a member of the trial team from the counterterrorism section. 
THE COURT: You’re not a member of the trial team. It’s been going on for a 
month or so and you haven’t been here, have you? 
 
Read: How a Federal Judge in Texas Berated a Federal Prosecutor, WASH. POST, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/read-how-a-federal-judge-in-texas-
berated-a-federal-prosecutor/1857/ [https://perma.cc/5RWJ-YAZG] (giving easy access to 
Transcript of Proceedings at 4, United States v. Al Hardan, No. H-16-CR-003 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 28, 2016)). 
102 Id. (“Don’t let those son of bitches use your account. And put that in the record. 
They’ll do something terrible, and you’ll get blamed for it.”). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. Judge Hughes, after making Mr. Patel retrieve his passport, told him that if he 
wanted to “be a lawyer dress like a lawyer” and to “act like a lawyer.” Id. 
105 Id. (“So, what is the utility to me and to the people of America to have you fly down 
here at their expense, eat at their expense, and stay at their expense when there are plenty of 
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Judge Hughes then excused Mr. Patel from the in-chambers meeting.106 The lawyers 
in Washington, D.C. were aghast by Judge Hughes’ treatment of their colleague, Mr. 
Patel.107 They apparently had some trouble obtaining a copy of the transcript of the 
in-chambers meeting.108 Their fumbling led Judge Hughes to issue a written 
benchslap, styled as an “Order on Ineptitude.”109 Judge Hughes’ order provided: 
 
1. If the pretentious lawyers from “main” justice knew what they were 
doing—or had the humility to ask for help from the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of Texas—it would not have taken 
three days, seven telephone calls, three voicemail messages, and one 
snippy electronic message for them to indirectly ask the court for 
assistance in ordering a transcript. 
 
2. The Washington lawyers might have looked at the Court’s website: 
http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/OrderingTranscripts.110 
 
The urge to benchslap attorneys is by no means limited to trial-level courts. 
Instead, renowned federal appellate jurists have entered the fray. U.S Court of 
Appeals Judge Posner issued a particularly well-known benchslap to the appellant’s 
counsel in Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co.111 That opinion covered two cases 
consolidated for appeal, both raising issues of forum non conveniens.112 Judge 
Posner questioned counsel’s decisions in both cases to not discuss the court’s prior 
decisions in Abad v. Bayer Corp.113 and Chang v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,114 which 
presented the “identical issue” as the present case.115 In one of the consolidated 
cases, the opening brief was filed prior to the issuance of Abad and Chang because 
of a long delay between opening and response briefing.116 However, the court noted 
that the reply brief touched on Abad only slightly and failed to discuss Chang, 
																																								 																				
capable people over there, in this room plus over there? You don’t add a bit of value, do 
you?”). 
106 Id. 
107 Goldman, supra note 100. According to anonymous sources at the Department of 
Justice, “the episode has left those very lawyers in the Justice Department fuming at the 
rough handling of their colleague.” Id. 
108 Id. (“When word of the hearing reached Patel’s bosses in Washington, they 
apparently tried to get a transcript of the session, but with some difficulty. Their efforts 
provoked another rebuke from Hughes, who issued his ‘Order on Ineptitude’ – now being 
passed around legal circles like a deliciously illicit piece of literature.”). 
109 United States v. Al Hardan, No. H-16-CR-003 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2016). 
110 Id. 
111 662 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2011). 
112 Id. at 933.  
113 563 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2009). 
114 599 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2010). 
115 Gonzalez-Servin, 662 F.3d at 933. 
116 Id. at 934. 
2017] BENCHSLAPS 351 
despite being filed after the issuance of the two controlling cases and being relied 
on in the defendant’s response brief.117  
Judge Posner suggested that counsel, when faced with adverse precedent, may 
argue that the court should distinguish it or overrule it—not ignore it.118 Judge 
Posner then, in both words and pictures, suggested that the attorneys were practicing 
law like ostriches, by sticking their heads in the sand to hide from difficult 
precedent—referring to one attorney by name twice: 
 
The ostrich is a noble animal, but not a proper model for an appellate 
advocate. (Not that ostriches really bury their heads in the sand when 
threatened; don’t be fooled by the picture below.) The ‘ostrich-like tactic 
of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant’s 
contention does not exist is as unprofessional as it is pointless.’ 
																																								 																				
117 Id. 
118 Id. Judge Posner warned: 
 
When there is apparently dispositive precedent, an appellant may urge its 
overruling or distinguishing or reserve a challenge to it for a petition for certiorari 
but may not simply ignore it. We don’t know the thinking that led the appellants’ 
counsel in these two cases to do that. But we do know that the two sets of cases 
out of which the appeals arise, involving the blood-products and 
Bridgestone/Firestone tire litigations, generated many transfers under the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens, three of which we affirmed in the two ignored 
precedents. There are likely to be additional such appeals; maybe appellants think 
that if they ignore our precedents their appeals will not be assigned to the same 
panel as decided the cases that established the precedents. Whatever the reason, 
such advocacy is unacceptable. 
 
Id. 
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The attorney in the vehicular accident case, David S. ‘Mac’ 
McKeand, is especially culpable, because he filed his opening brief as well 
as his reply brief after the Abad decision yet mentioned it in neither brief 
despite the heavy reliance that opposing counsel placed on it in their 
response brief. In contrast, counsel in the blood-products appeal could not 
have referred to either Abad or Chang in their opening brief, did try to 
distinguish Abad (if unpersuasively) in their reply brief, and may have 
thought that Chang added nothing to Abad. Their advocacy left much to 
be desired, but McKeand’s left more.119 
 
These examples of benchslaps represent more than a judge managing the 
lawyers’ behavior. Instead of meeting the attorney’s unprofessional or unethical 
conduct with dispassionate and professional counseling or sanctions, the judges in 
these benchslaps took the opportunity to use their authority to shame and belittle the 
lawyers. Like weaker children on the playground or subordinate employees in a 
workplace, these lawyers had nowhere to run from this judicial bullying. Like those 
victims, these lawyers also had little recourse given their inability to retaliate in kind 
and the court’s and judicial ethics commissions’ unwillingness or inability to address 
the problem. 
																																								 																				
119 Id. at 934–35 (quoting Mannheim Video, Inc. v. Cty. of Cook, 884 F.2d 1043, 1047 
(7th Cir. 1989)). 
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C.  Provoking the Slap: Benchslaps as Inappropriate Reactions to Attorney 
Breaches of the Core Ethical Duties of an Advocate 
 
A review of even the few benchslaps illustrated here reveals a common 
provocation—attorney misconduct during the course of litigation that rises to the 
level of at least a potential violation of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. This 
should come as no surprise. It would be highly unlikely, and even more 
inappropriate, for a benchslap to be unprovoked or to be randomly issued. It is also 
consistent with what we know of bullying—it is planned behavior to achieve a 
particular goal. Each involves some action by the attorney that gets up the judicial 
dander and results in the publication of the benchslap. 
All attorneys, regardless of their practice jurisdiction, owe basic ethical 
obligations of competence, candor, and decorum; attorneys must avoid raising 
frivolous arguments not only to their clients but also to the tribunals before which 
they appear.120 The public, and even some members of the bar, often misperceive 
the advocacy duties as boiling down to one—“do anything to win” or, in the terms 
of the former canons of professional conduct, to “represent a client zealously within 
the bounds of the law.”121 However, the advocacy duties serve as important 
counterweights to that common misperception. Vigorous enforcement of these 
duties protects the public from ethically wayward attorneys, protects the 
administration of justice by ensuring that decisions are based on the law and facts 
and not on lawyerly bluster or trickery, and protects the legal profession from the 
tarnished reputation such tactics would bring.122   
The enumeration of the duty of competence as Model Rule 1.1 signifies that it 
is the most basic of the advocacy duties.123 While most of the commentary speaks of 
the rule in terms of duties owed to the client, we can also think of the duty of 
competence running to the tribunal as well—imposing on the lawyer the obligation 
of competent practice and assistance to the court in litigating a case.124 That first-
																																								 																				
120 See Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the Internet and Other Electronic Sources 
on an Attorney’s Duty of Competence Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 89, 90 (2000) (noting that a majority of states have adopted the ABA Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 imposing a duty of competence on attorneys); supra notes 
70–72 and accompanying text. 
121 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
122 See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the 
“unique duties of an advocate” along with judicial supervision of litigation protects litigants 
from “overzealous advocates”).  
123 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); John M. Burman, 
Lawyers’ and Judges’ Ethical Duty of Competence, 33 WYO. LAW. 34, 34 (2010) (noting 
that “all lawyers should want to fulfill what may be the most basic duty lawyers owe to their 
clients: the duty to be competent”). 
124 Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469, 1470 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The duty that 
the bar owes to this court is mirrored by counsel’s duty to represent clients competently.”); 
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order duty requires an attorney to “provide competent representation to a client” 
requiring “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation.”125 The duty is not inflexible, and it does not require 
the exhaustion of all available time and monetary resources for matters large and 
small. Instead, the duty is tied to the complexity of the matter—the more complex, 
the more “attention and preparation” is required. 126 Nor does the duty of competence 
require attorney perfection.127 Instead, the hallmark of the duty of competence, like 
many things in the law, is reasonableness.128   
Yet, reasonableness does not imply that the duty is so amorphous so as to 
become merely aspirational. Instead, the duty has real bite in the context of litigation. 
Thus, competence requires an attorney to perform appropriate research on the factual 
and legal basis of a claim.129 The failure to perform basic legal research has been 
																																								 																				
McCrickard v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., No. A131224, 2012 WL 3568480, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 20, 2012) (“In our view, any attorney who engages in civil litigation has a duty of 
competence to understand the rules of discovery.”); Temples v. Crow, No. 99-1147-CIV-T-
17A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17724, at *14 (M.D. FL. 1999) (reminding counsel that “the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Florida Bar require candor toward the tribunal, and a 
duty of competence. Rule 4.1.1 and Rule 4-3.3(3) imply a duty to know and disclose to the 
court adverse legal authority” (quoting Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc., 687 So.2d 353, 355 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1997))). 
125 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); Burman, supra 
note 123, at 34 (noting that the duty of competence has both legal and ethical implications in 
that the duty of duty competence is “more often enforced through malpractice actions rather 
than through the grievance process”). 
126 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The 
required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation 
and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser 
complexity and consequence.”).  
127 Paul J. Sax, When Worlds Collide: Ethics v. Economics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 365, 
366 (1991) (concluding “that there can be little doubt that relevant ethical principles impose 
duties that contract and expand with the properly limited scope of the client engagement, 
because the lawyer’s duty of competence does not require doing all work necessary to get 
the answer right, but instead only the amount of work appropriate to the client engagement”).  
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (noting that a lawyer must act “with reasonable competence and diligence”). 
129 Commonwealth v. McDaniels, 785 A.2d 120, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (noting that 
attorney fell “well below the level of thoroughness and preparation required for competent 
representation” where the attorney’s Anders brief named the wrong client and listed crimes 
of which the defendant was not convicted); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer must be able to ascertain applicable rules of law, whether or 
not commonly known or settled, using standard research sources.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (noting that 
competence and diligence requires “appropriate factual research, legal analysis, and exercise 
of professional judgment”).  
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found to be inconsistent with an attorney’s duty of competence.130 Further, attorneys 
have been disciplined by state bars where the violation of the duty of competence 
was premised on the attorney’s failure to conduct sufficient research and to provide 
that research to the court in briefs or in other representations to the court.131  
In Kentucky Bar Assoc. v. Brown,132 the Kentucky Supreme Court suspended 
an attorney for sixty days based only on a breach of the duty of competence.133 The 
attorney filed an appellate brief with the Kentucky Court of Appeals that was 
substandard in form and content.134 Not only was the brief missing sections, such as 
a brief introduction, a statement of the case, and a conclusion,135 those parts of the 
brief that were included fell well below the standard for competent representation.136 
The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with the bar association’s characterization of 
the brief as “a little more than fifteen unclear and ungrammatical sentences, slapped 
together as two pages of unedited text with an unintelligible message.”137 The court 
noted that the “brief would compare unfavorably with the majority of the 
handwritten pro se pleadings prepared by laypersons.”138 
																																								 																				
130 Nickels v. Conway, 480 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2012) (excusing failure to file a 
habeas corpus petition based on the attorney’s violation of Rule 1.1 when she failed to 
understand the consequences of a late petition); Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 
152 (2d Cir. 2003) (excusing failure to file a habeas corpus petition based on extraordinary 
circumstances including defense counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 1.1 when she “did no 
legal research on [the defendant’s] case”).  
131 Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469, 1473 (7th Cir. 1990) (imposing $500 fine 
and warning counsel that further breaches of competence would be met with suspension from 
practice before the court where attorney’s brief was “rambling, almost totally 
incomprehensible in its treatment of the issues and legal principles”); In re Willis, 505 A.2d 
50, 50–51 (D.C. 1985) (per curiam) (ordering 60-day suspension for violation of duty of 
competence where attorney filed briefs that “were sloppy, incoherent, incomplete and 
misleading on their face . . . [and] prepared . . . without any meaningful investigation.” 
(quoting In re Crestwell, 30 B.R 619, 620 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1983))); State ex rel. Okla. Bar 
Ass’n v. Hensley, 661 P.2d 527, 530 (Okla. 1983) (disbarring attorney in part based on 
violation of duty of competence where the attorney’s “unexplained failure to ascertain what 
she knew to be basic and statutorily defined points of law readily ascertainable by any 
member of the bar”). 
132 14 S.W.3d 916 (Ky. 2000). 
133 The Kentucky Bar Association alleged that the attorney violated SCR 3.130-1.1: “A 
lawyer must provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.” Id. at 918. 
134 Id. at 917–18. 
135 Id. at 917. 
136 Id. at 918–19. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 919 (citations omitted).  
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The duty of candor, likewise included in the Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility,139 is one of the earliest formal rules of attorney conduct.140 Under 
this duty, attorneys cannot knowingly make false statements of fact or law to a 
tribunal.141 The duty includes acts of omission and requires attorneys to disclose 
“legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”142 While 
commonly misperceived, the duty of candor is not satisfied by a lawyer deciding not 
to raise a case with the court because he or she believes that it is distinguishable.143 
Thus, the duty of candor is not limited to so-called “controlling authorities.”144 
Instead, it is generally understood that a lawyer has a duty to disclose any decision 
that is “directly adverse to any proposition of law on which the lawyer expressly 
relies, which would reasonably be considered important by the judge sitting on the 
case.”145 Thus the duty requires the consideration of factors to determine its 
application to a particular case.146 And the scope of the duty would depend on the 
																																								 																				
139 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
140 Raymond J. McKoski, The Truth Be Told: The Need for a Model Rule Defining a 
Lawyer’s Duty of Candor to a Client, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 73, 74 (2014) (“A lawyer’s 
duty to scrupulously avoid the presentation of false information to the court was embodied 
in the first English statute regulating the legal profession. Enacted by Parliament in 1275, the 
First Statute of Westminster provided that a lawyer who perpetrated or consented to any 
‘Deceit or Collusion in the King’s Court’ would be imprisoned for a year and a day and 
barred from further court appearances.”). 
141 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
142 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“In 
representing a client in a matter before a tribunal, a lawyer may not knowingly make a false 
statement of a material proposition of law to the tribunal; or fail to disclose to the tribunal 
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to 
the position asserted by the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”). 
143 Tyler v. State, 47 P.3d 1095, 1105–06 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); ABA Comm’n on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 280 (1949). 
144 ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984); 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 280 (1949). 
145 ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984); 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 280 (1949).  
146 The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility suggested the 
following test: 
 
Is the decision which opposing counsel has overlooked one which the court should 
clearly consider in deciding the case? Would a reasonable judge properly feel that 
a lawyer who advanced, as the law, a proposition adverse to the undisclosed 
decision, was lacking in candor and fairness to him? Might the judge consider 
himself misled by an implied representation that the lawyer knew of no adverse 
authority? 
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complexity of the case—shrinking in cases where the law is well settled and 
understood, but expanding in cases where the law is new or unsettled.147 Regardless, 
in cases of doubt, lawyers are counseled to favor disclosure.148 Thus, in Mannheim 
Video, Inc. v. County of Cook,149 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, while ruling on an appeal from the district court’s refusal to grant Rule 11 
sanctions, noted that it would have upheld sanctions if the lower court had issued 
them.150 There, counsel failed to cite a case which he thought was not “dispositive” 
but “at best only persuasive.”151 While noting that the lawyer was “technically 
correct,” the court noted that the lawyer had a duty to disclose not only controlling 
cases but “potentially dispositive authorities” and that “the word ‘potentially’ 
deliberately included those cases arguably dispositive.”152 Likewise, in Tyler v. 
State,153 the Alaska Court of Appeals found that an attorney violated his duty of 
candor by failing to cite a case that he “honestly believed” was distinguishable.154 
While acknowledging “that appellate litigation is a contest, not a seminar,” the court 
found that the failure to disclose was inconsistent with candor.155 
Thus, the duty of candor represents a “paramount” counterbalance to the well-
known duty stemming from the former Code of Professional Responsibility to 
																																								 																				
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984); ABA 
Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 280 (1949). 
147 ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984); 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 280 (1949) (“We felt the duty 
should be interpreted sensibly so as not to produce absurd results, but concluded that ‘Where 
the question is a new or novel one, such as the constitutionality or construction of a statute, 
on which there is a dearth of authority, the lawyer’s duty may be broader.’”). 
148 ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984); 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 280 (1949). 
149 884 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1989). 
150 Id. at 1046–47. 
151 Id. at 1047. 
152 Id.; see also Borowski v. DePuy, Inc., 850 F.2d 297, 304–05 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that Counsel’s “ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against 
[his] contention does not exist [is] precisely the type of behavior that would justify 
imposing . . . sanctions”); Massey v. Prince George’s County, 918 F. Supp. 905, 908 (D. Md. 
1996) (noting that duty includes a case that “comes anywhere close to being relevant to a 
disputed issue”); In re Bowen, No. 12-31699-KLP, 2015 WL 5717439, at *1, *3 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2015) (holding that counsel has a duty not only to cite to adverse authority 
but “also must bring to the attention of the deciding court another court’s ruling against the 
lawyer’s client on the same issue”); Shaeffer v. State Bar of Cal., 160 P.2d 825, 829 (Cal. 
1945) (noting that the duty of disclosure required counsel to disclose a case the lawyer 
thought was mere dictum). 
153 47 P.3d 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
154 Id. at 1107. 
155 Id. at 1108. 
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represent a client zealously.156 Candor requires the lawyer, as an officer of the court, 
to constrain his or her advocacy so that the client’s interests are represented but not 
at the expense of the integrity of the justice system.157 While lawyers are still 
expected to advocate on behalf of their client as to what the law is or should be, the 
lawyer cannot simply ignore relevant authority.158 
The duty of decorum generally prevents attorneys from engaging in 
“undignified or discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal.”159 And, like the duty 
of candor, decorum can sometimes place the lawyer between a rock and a hard place. 
Too little vigor in representing a client’s interest presents malpractice or disciplinary 
liability, but too much crosses from zealousness to undignified conduct.160 This duty 
also imposes on the lawyer the obligation to turn the other cheek when faced with 
discourteous conduct from others. The comments to Rule 3.5 make clear that an 
attorney cannot use a judge’s intemperate conduct towards him as an excuse for 
retaliatory discourteous conduct.161   
The final duty restraining a lawyer’s advocacy is Model Rule 3.1’s duty to 
refrain from raising frivolous arguments.162 Under Rule 3.1, “[a] lawyer shall not 
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is 
																																								 																				
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (noting that 
the “obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force” is “qualified by the 
advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal”); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of the 
“Unpublished” Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of 
Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 27, 76–77, n.218 (2005). 
157 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“This Rule 
sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that 
undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.”). 
158 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“Legal 
argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty towards 
the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must 
recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. . . . The underlying concept is that legal 
argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the 
case.”). 
159 KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(d) (2016); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (prohibiting “conduct intended to disrupt a 
tribunal”). 
160 Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be Civil: Defining 
Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 144 (2011–
2012); Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Mind Your Manners, 83 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 10, 10 (October 
2014) (“Advocacy that exceeded zealousness and crossed into discourteousness has landed 
attorneys in ethical hot water.”). 
161 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer 
may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge’s default 
is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, 
protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient 
firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.”). 
162 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
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a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”163 Despite the 
image of the movie-lawyer papering his opposition with frivolous motions in some 
litigation war of attrition, Rule 3.1 prevents real-life lawyers from using the litigation 
process to harass or abuse another party.164 That a claim is eventually judged to be 
unmeritorious does not make it necessarily frivolous and violative of Rule 3.1.165 In 
fact, even a lawyer’s belief that a claim may not be successful does not make it 
frivolous.166 Instead, Rule 3.1 requires lawyers to act reasonably and to make 
reasonable investigation of the relevant facts and laws.167 In federal court, a similar 
restriction on a lawyer’s advocacy is represented by Rule 11. In fact, courts have 
based a violation of Rule 3.1 on a court issuing Rule 11 sanctions for bringing 
unsupported claims.168  
In light of this quartette of advocacy duties, it is plain that the attorney 
misbehavior which provoked the judges into responding with a benchslap was not 
just garden variety unprofessionalism. While all attorneys strive to be professional 
and the state bars have attempted to raise the level of professionalism—
unprofessional conduct that comes short of crossing an ethical boundary is not 
																																								 																				
163 Id.  
164 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The 
advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but 
also a duty not to abuse legal procedure.”). Although, it should be noted that this rule does 
not prevent a criminal defense lawyer from raising issues or arguments that might be 
otherwise prohibited. Id. at cmt. 3. 
165 See, e.g., Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Neely, 528 S.E.2d 468, 473 (W. Va. 1998) 
(“An action or claim is not frivolous if after a reasonable investigation, all the facts have not 
been first substantiated. A complaint may be filed if evidence is expected to be developed by 
discovery. A lawyer may not normally be sanctioned for alleging facts in a complaint that 
are later determined to be untrue.”). 
166 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
167 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“What is 
required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ 
cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in 
support of their clients’ positions.”). 
168 See, e.g., In re Boone, 66 P.3d 896, 897 (Kan. 2003). 
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sanctionable.169 As one state chief justice said, “ethics is that which is required and 
professionalism is that which is expected.”170 
However, the conduct seen in the benchslaps crossed from merely 
unprofessional and into breaches of the advocacy duties. Thus, the attorneys in 
Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., whose failure to adequately brief the issues so 
frustrated the judge, were not merely an example of shoddy or unprofessional 
lawyering to be avoided. Instead, that failure to conduct the necessary research and 
																																								 																				
169 Gregory R. Hanthorn, When Breaches of Professionalism Become Sanctionable, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 5, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/ethics/ 
articles/winter2014-0214-when-breaches-professionalism-become-sanctionable.html 
[https://perma.cc/YH7D-5UR3] (pointing out that not all breaches of professionalism are 
sanctionable, and noting that “most professionalism standards [are simply] viewed as 
aspirational”). The distinction between ethics and professionalism is particularly apparent 
when looking to states’ continuing legal education requirements. See Florida MCLE 
Requirements, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states 
/states_a-k/florida.html [https://perma.cc/38VB-MNFG] (listing continuing legal education 
requirements focused on professionalism as distinct from ethics); Georgia MCLE 
Requirements, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states 
/states_a-k/georgia.html [https://perma.cc/6LUS-F36K]; Louisiana MCLE Requirements, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states/states_l-
o/louisiana.html [https://perma.cc/AU3C-MBYS]; Mississippi MCLE Requirements, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states/states_l-
o/mississippi.html [https://perma.cc/WM74-GU5U].    
170 Evanoff v. Evanoff, 418 S.E.2d 62, 63 (Ga. 1992) (per curiam); Campbell, supra 
note 160, at 139 (“To put it another way, ethical obligations can be seen as the shall-nots of 
lawyering, and professionalism as creating affirmative obligations of the lawyer to the 
broader society.”). Similar aspirations can be seen in attempts to create professionalism or 
civil codes separate from the rules of professional responsibility. For example, the Kansas 
Supreme Court has adopted “Pillars of Professionalism” as a guide to attorneys seeking to 
conduct their practice in a professional manner: 
 
Admission to practice law in Kansas carries with it not only the ethical 
requirements found in the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, but also a duty 
of professionalism. Law students who aspire to be members of the Kansas bar 
should also heed these guidelines. Kansas lawyers have a duty to perform their 
work professionally by behaving in a manner that reflects the best legal traditions, 
with civility, courtesy, and consideration. Acting in such a manner helps lawyers 
preserve the public trust that lawyers guard and protect the role of justice in our 
society. Lawyers frequently interact with clients, courts, opposing counsel and 
parties, and the public at large. A lawyer’s actions also reflect on the entire legal 
profession. With those interactions in mind, the following Pillars of 
Professionalism have been prepared. These Pillars should guide lawyers in 
striving for professionalism. 
 
Kansas Pillars of Professionalism, KANS. BAR ASS’N (October 25, 2012), 
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/pillars-of-professionalism/ [https://perma.cc/2QTU-8PD6]. 
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to prepare the required depth of legal analysis was, at a minimum, a likely violation 
of Rule 1.1’s competency requirement. Likewise, Judge Hughes’s “Order on 
Ineptitude” could be more aptly styled as an order on “incompetence” for the 
lawyers’ inability to perform basic research on the local rules and processes. Judge 
Posner’s pictograph benchslap was not merely a reaction to subpar advocacy, but 
raised serious issues of whether the lawyers failed to disclose directly adverse 
authority as required by their duty of candor.171 Similarly, Judge Sparks’s role as 
kindergarten cop was not brought on by lawyers who were just not playing well in 
the litigation sandbox, but by at least one side arguably raising frivolous arguments 
to harass the other party.172 
Thus, in each of those cases, issues weightier than just frustrating litigation 
tactics were at play. At best, each presented potential violations of the core ethical 
duties all advocates owe to their clients and the court. Yet, none of those potential 
violations were addressed in a way contemplated by those rules. Instead of noting 
and reporting the violations to the appropriate disciplinary committees for full and 
fair investigations and hearings, the judges in those cases took a more public position 
on the alleged breaches and engaged in a blunter method of enforcement—public 
shaming through a benchslap. 
 
D.  Slaps in the Spotlight: The Internet and the Widespread Dissemination of 
Judicial Benchslaps 
 
Unlike benchslaps of old, which may have sat on dusty bookshelves in rarely 
opened volumes of the case reporters, today’s benchslaps are much more assessable 
and much more widely read. The wide availability of published and unpublished 
decisions on electronic legal search platforms, such as Westlaw, Lexis, and 
Bloomberg, make it all too easy for judges, lawyers, law students, or anyone with 
access to the system to search for and find references to individual lawyer’s names 
if they are mentioned by the judge in the offending order. While these references 
would have been unsearchable under the digest research system most lawyers used 
until just fifteen or so years ago, with cheap and widely available term search 
capability, these have become all too easy to find.173  
																																								 																				
171 Gonzales-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2011). 
172 Klein-Becker, L.L.C. v. Stanley, No. A-03-CA-871-SS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19151, at *10 n.3 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2004) (stating that counsel’s “purpose in pleading the 
fraud counterclaim is simply to harass and alarm”). 
173 See Patrick W. Spangler, The New World Versus the Old World of Legal Research: 
Are Print Resources Completely a Thing of the Past?, 20 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 48, 49 (2006) 
(discussing a study that showed “overwhelmingly, attorneys use Westlaw and Lexis for basic 
case research,” and noting that “[e]ven among the older lawyers . . . [a]lmost nobody said ‘I 
[march] down to the library [to] find the Federal Reporter’”). According to David 
Dilenschneider, who oversees content development for LexisNexis, “[t]oday, virtually 100 
percent of practitioners use online research.” Drew Singer, Legal Research Moves from the 
Print Library to Expensive Digital Databases, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (March 21, 2011), 
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A simple search for the term “benchslap” on the internet returns thousands of 
results.174 One of the most popular legal blogs, AbovetheLaw.com, has two sections 
of its website dedicated to benchslaps: the first a general listing and summary of 
benchslaps, and the second a chronicling of the “Benchslap of the Day” for those 
that apparently go above and beyond the routine.175 Other blogs have gotten into the 
game as well. For example, Lawyerist.com contains an entry entitled, “Six 
Benchslaps to Brighten Your Day.”176 One law firm website contains an entry on its 
blog summarizing a state court of appeals case entitled “It’s a Benchslap Party!”177 
Even blogs designed for academics have taken to using the term and summarizing 
the newest examples.178 The term and interest in it has expanded beyond legal blogs 
and into the more general popular culture.179   
These online mentions and summaries of benchslaps are just as permanent as 
the actual published order and all the more damaging to an attorney’s reputation 
given their ease of access.180 This effect is not lost on those who publicize 
benchslaps. AbovetheLaw.com published a series of posts following a court’s 





174 Google Search Results for Benchslap, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search for 
“Benchslap”; then look for the small print at the top of the results for an estimation of the 
total results). 
175 Benchslaps, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/benchslaps/?rf=1 
[https://perma.cc/KG3L-WU36]. 
176 Lisa Needham, Six Benchslaps to Brighten Your Day, LAWYERIST.COM (Oct. 2, 
2015), https://lawyerist.com/76537/six-benchslaps-will-brighten-day/ [https://perma.cc/2L 
Q2-72EQ]. 
177 3d DCA Watch – It’s a Benchslap Party!, S. FLA. LAW. (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://southfloridalawyers.blogspot.com/2015/11/3d-dca-watch-its-benchslap-party.html 
[https://perma.cc/69PH-G9DF]. 
178 See, e.g., Legal Writing Prof, Another Seventh Circuit Bench Slap, LEGAL WRITING 
PROF BLOG (July 19, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwriting/2015/07/another 
-seventh-circuit-bench-slap.html [https://perma.cc/YS6F-SEEX] (summarizing a benchslap 
out of the Seventh Circuit). 
179 URBAN DICTIONARY, supra note 55. 
180 See Meg Leta Ambrose, It’s About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the 
Right to be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 369 (2013) (“The current consensus is 
that information, once online, is there forever.”); Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of 
One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 
75 (2007) (noting that internet information’s “digital permanence, searchability, 
replicability, transformability, and multitude of often unintended audiences make its effects 
more damaging than ever”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-
t2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RHJ6-JZAR] (noting that “the Internet 
records everything and forgets nothing” and reminding readers that “every online photo, 
status update, Twitter post and blog entry . . . can be stored forever”). 
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by failing to cite relevant authority.181 The court ultimately concluded that the 
lawyers failed in their duty, but declined to issue sanctions or to revoke their pro hac 
vice admissions.182 In reporting on the final disposition, the article crystalized the 
danger of these public benchslaps: “Yes, being the subject of extensive benchslap 
coverage on AbovetheLaw is sanction enough. We’ve moved past the days of scarlet 
letters, but Google footprints have much greater reach.”183 
Recognizing this potential scarlet letter effect, there have been some who have 
advocated that the courts should more routinely name and accuse lawyers of ethical 
breaches in written orders.184 However, those arguments largely ignore the potential 
damage that flows from such public and embarrassing accusations.   
Professor John Levy first criticized the judiciary for failing its duty to report 
attorney misconduct.185 Professor Levy then proposed that courts use written orders 
to summarize alleged ethical breaches as the “reporting-triggering mechanism” for 
investigation by appropriate disciplinary committees.186 Professor Levy recognized 
both the potential stigma for the wrongly accused “innocent” attorney and the need 
for “fairness” in any reporting system.187 However, he discounted that damage 
because, in his view, the accusations of ethical misconduct would be read only by 
other lawyers and those lawyers would empathize with the lawyer in the case and 
“take the accusations for what they are.”188 Giving the danger of the false accusation 
little weight, Professor Levy easily found that it was outweighed by the need to 
“strengthen the enforcement system.”189 Even assuming that balance was correctly 
																																								 																				
181 David Lat, Benchslap Update: Skadden Partners Learn Their Fates, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Jan. 18, 2013) http://abovethelaw.com/2013/01/benchslap-update-skadden-partners-
learn-their-fates/ [https://perma.cc/UB5M-BNKP]. 
182 See Thul v. OneWest Bank, FSB, No. 12 C 6380, 2013 WL 212926, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 18, 2013). 
183 Lat, supra note 181. 
184 Monroe H. Freedman, The Use of Unethical and Unconstitutional Practices and 
Policies by Prosecutors’ Offices, 52 WASHBURN. L.J. 1, 2 (2012); Levy, supra note 5, at 116. 
185 Levy, supra note 5, at 106; infra Part III.A. 
186 Levy, supra note 5, at 109 n.70.  
187 Id. at 108–09. 
188 Id. at 109. Professor Levy noted: 
 
Ironically, the fact that the accusations would be in appellate court opinions would 
probably lessen the damage to the lawyer’s reputation because of one of the 
factors which keeps lawyers from turning in other lawyers – empathy. While 
reading the cases for this article I found myself thinking of all the possible things 
that would justify or excuse the conduct of the lawyer about whom I was reading. 
Generally, lawyers are the only people who regularly read appellate opinions and 
by their identification with the lawyer in the opinion, they are more inclined to 
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struck in the pre-Internet age, the dissemination of these accusations on the Internet 
upsets that balance. First, observing the posts and the comments that follow 
reporting on benchslaps reveals little in the way of empathy.190 Second, these 
accusations are no longer relegated to little-read appellate decisions. Instead, they 
are immediately discovered through simple Internet searches and are the subject of 
widely read blogs.   
More recently, renowned legal ethics scholar Professor Monroe Freedman 
suggested that courts should more often name names in written opinions to highlight 
and punish lawyers’ unethical conduct.191 In his essay describing examples of 
prosecutors’ unethical conduct, Professor Freedman noted that in many of the cases, 
the court would refer to the offending attorney not by name but by some generic 
label.192 While never directly arguing that courts should specifically call out ethically 
challenged lawyers by name, his implication that courts should do so is clear.193 In 
one case where the court did name the offending prosecutor, Professor Freedman 
noted that this was an “unusual step” and described the U.S. Attorney’s office’s 
failure to convince the court to delete the reference to the prosecutor’s name in the 
published decision.194 While naming names in published decisions would partially 
																																								 																				
190 For example, a blog post by David Lat on AbovetheLaw.com gleefully reports that 
a lawyer was “mauled by an Article III bear” when U.S. Circuit Court Judge Easterbrook 
benchslapped an attorney for filing an inadequate appendix. David Lat, Benchslap of the 
Day: You Won’t Like Judge Easterbrook When He’s Mad, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/benchslap-of-the-day-you-wont-like-judge-easterbrook-
when-hes-mad/ [https://perma.cc/EZT5-UDYS]. The article noted that the attorney had been 
reprimanded by a district judge and had a case before the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed as 
improvidently granted and congratulated him, by name “on winning the benchslap trifecta.” 
Id. The article is long on humor but noticeably short on empathy. See id.   
191 Freedman, supra note 184, at 2–3.  
192 Id. at 3–4 (noting that the court referred to the lawyer only as “the Government” or 
“a prosecutor”); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting 
that “appellate courts have generally been reluctant to name the individual prosecutors” 
making inappropriate comments during trial and declining to name the prosecutor by name 
because “his improper remarks, though ill-advised, were not instances of deliberate 
misconduct”).  
193 Freedman, supra note 184, at 9 (noting that the court “took pains not to name any 
particular prosecutor”); Charles E. MacLean, Anecdote as Stereotype: One Prosecutor’s 
Response to Professor Monroe Freedman’s Article “The Use of Unethical and 
Unconstitutional Practices and Policies by Prosecutors’ Offices,” 52 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 27 
(2012) (noting that “Professor Freedman focuses on the fact that the offending prosecutors 
are not individually named in the courts’ opinions that found error or misconduct”). 
194 Freedman, supra note 184, at 7 (“If federal prosecutors receive public credit for their 
good works—as they should—they should not be able to hide behind the shield of anonymity 
when they make serious mistakes.” (quoting United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 
965 (9th Cir. 2012))). Other prosecuting attorneys have been more successful at excising 
their names from published judicial scoldings. See Bennett L. Gershman, Now You See it, 
Now You Don’t: Depublication and Nonpublication of Opinions Raise Motive Questions, 73 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 36, 37–39 (2001) (describing four such cases). 
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correct “the failure of courts and disciplinary committees to hold prosecutors 
accountable,” the question is at what cost does that benefit come?195 Given the 
heightened public interests at stake when it is a prosecutor, as opposed to a private 
attorney, who acts unethically or unconstitutionally perhaps justifies the heightened 
publicity that comes with Internet dissemination. However, these public accusations 
raise serious concerns under judicial ethics codes and due process norms that, when 
considered, should outweigh any slight benefit that may come from the public 
shaming of wayward prosecutors.196 And, if those benefits fall short of justifying 
such harsh treatment to reign in public prosecutors, they certainly fall short of 
justifying the public shaming of private attorneys as a method of enforcing ethical 
and professional norms. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Regardless of whether or not a system of enforcing ethical norms through the 
public shaming of benchslaps would be effective, the practice should not be on the 
menu of options for the judges as they fulfill their obligation to regulate attorney 
conduct. As others have already noted, when judges behave in this manner, whether 
in written opinions or from the bench, they erode the public’s confidence in the 
fairness of the judicial process.197 In general, the public’s confidence in the fairness 
of the judicial branch is shallowing. In a recent national poll, only 48% of the 
respondents thought that state courts make decisions “based on an objective review 
of facts and the law.”198 In contrast, those with recent direct experience with the 
court system give it high marks for fairness—with 70% indicating that they were 
“satisfied with the fairness of the process in [their] dealings with the court 
																																								 																				
195 Freedman, supra note 184, at 21; United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (“A reprimand in a published opinion that names the prosecutor is not without 
deterrent effect.”).  
196 See infra Part III. 
197 GREGORY C. SISK & MARK S. CADY, 16 IOWA PRACTICE SERIES: LAWYER AND 
JUDICIAL ETHICS § 18:1(b)(2) (2016) (author’s commentary) (“Rude or hostile behavior by 
a judge can also diminish public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary 
. . . especially when it develops into a pattern of conduct. . . . Public confidence in the 
impartiality of the judiciary is adversely affected even if conduct exhibiting impartiality is 
directed towards a single lawyer or a single law firm, and is otherwise uncharacteristic of the 
judge.”); Goodman, Causes of Judicial Misbehavior, supra note 9, at 954 (“In addition, 
judicial temperament has real consequences regarding the public’s perception of the judiciary 
as fair, trustworthy, and effective. . . . [J]udicial behavior, not just the outcome of judicial 
proceedings, impacts the public’s perception of the judiciary’s fairness.”). 
198 GBA STRATEGIES, ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY OF REGISTERED VOTERS 2 
(2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Public%20Trust%20and%20 
Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx [https://perma.cc/U8FH-XH3B] (noting 
that the poll found “a majority believe judges make decisions based more on their own beliefs 
and political pressure”). 
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system.”199 Those numbers suggest that something critical happens when people 
experience courts firsthand. As the wheels of justice grind unseen, people are 
skeptical of their fairness. However, going through the process restores trust and 
faith. Thus, judges must take care during those interactions to foster trust rather than 
confirm the incoming skepticism. Moreover, the negative effect of benchslaps on 
the public is particularly troubling. As seen from the disparate data, those without 
direct contact with the judiciary are more prone to distrust the institution. The 
publication of these benchslaps through the Internet and other popular social media 
platforms risks further eroding the general population’s already waning confidence 
in the judiciary. Given how quickly and widely information can travel, it takes only 
a few judges acting in ways inconsistent with the principles of fairness and decorum 
to erode general confidence.200  
If the fragility of the public’s confidence in the judiciary was not enough to 
counsel against the practice of benchslapping wayward attorneys, the cannons of 
judicial ethics and principles of due process mandate their elimination. 
Considerations of the judge’s own duty to report attorney misconduct, to act within 
the bounds of judicial decorum, and to ensure individuals’ rights to due process, all 
point strongly in the direction of eliminating the benchslap as a way to enforce 
ethical and professionalism standards. 
 
A.  Benchslaps as Breaches of Judges’ Duty to Report Attorney Misconduct 
 
As a self-regulating profession, both lawyers and judges must play an active 
role in the enforcement of ethical obligations less the privilege of self-regulation be 
revoked.201 Lawyers have an ethical obligation to report potential violations of 
ethical rules.202 Beyond the duty that would be required of judges as lawyers, judges 
have an independent ethical requirement to report ethical breaches.203 This should 
come as no surprise given the judiciary’s solemn and critical role in the regulation 
																																								 																				
199 Id. 
200 Arthur Selwyn Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and 
Reflections, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (1970) (“That some judges—however few 
in number is beside the point, for even one rotten judicial apple can go far toward spoiling 
the entire judicial barrel—fall short of the requisite standards of integrity and propriety 
(nebulous and ill-defined though they may be) creates a large part of the problem of public 
confidence.”). 
201 It has been long understood that, unlike other professions, the legal profession is 
self-regulated “and outside the purview of the legislature.” Ippolito v. Florida, 824 F. Supp. 
1562, 1570 (M.D. Fla. 1993). The basis for this self-regulation includes the profession’s 
long-history of self-regulation and separation of powers concerns.  
202 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer who 
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”). 
203 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
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of professional ethics.204 The judge’s role is elevated in importance for two reasons. 
First, litigation allows a judge to observe many lawyers in a context where stress and 
temptation combine to make ethical lapses both likely and dangerous to the 
profession.205 Second, judges’ recognition of unethical conduct and their reactions 
to that conduct serve a norm-setting function.206 Thus, a judge’s expectation of 
exacting ethical standards and the enforcement of that expectation through reports 
to proper authorities or less formal, though still considered, counseling signals to the 
lawyers that ethical and professional standards in the legal profession are highly 
valued. However, a judge’s decision to meet lawyer misconduct with his or her own 
brand of public shaming and ridicule signals that ethics and professionalism are 
necessary for only some—lawyers not judges. 
The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct creates a 
stair-step duty to report attorney misconduct—imposing a more rigorous duty for 
more serious ethical lapses.207 Thus, judges are required to report when they have 
knowledge of an attorney’s violation of an ethical rule that “raises a substantial 
question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.”208 However, when a judge “receives information indicating a 
substantial likelihood” that a lawyer breached an ethical rule, the judge is required 
																																								 																				
204 MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 cmt. D (1999) (“Judges are required 
by this Section to participate actively in maintaining and preserving the integrity of the 
judicial system. The rule is necessary because judges make up a significant group that may 
have information about colleagues’ misconduct. For this reason, judges have an opportunity 
and a special duty to protect the public from the consequences of serious misconduct and the 
potential harmful results of other violations of the Code.”); see Abramson, supra note 7, at 
753 (“The ethical responsibility of a judge to effectively begin the disciplinary process 
against fellow lawyers and judicial associates is a heavy burden.”); Greenbaum, Judicial 
Reporting, supra note 5, at 537 (“It has long been recognized that judges can and should play 
a central role in the lawyer disciplinary process by reporting substantial lawyer misconduct 
they observe to disciplinary authorities.”). 
205 Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to 
Disciplinary Authorities: Filling the Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 484 (2012) 
[hereinafter Greenbaum, Automatic Reporting] (noting that “[j]udges are well situated to 
witness and evaluate certain forms of misconduct”). 
206 Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, Judicial Attitudes 
Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2004) (“While much of the litigation action occurs outside the 
courtroom, judges set the norms for that out-of-court litigation conduct through the signals 
that they send and the sanctions they impose for conduct that occurs during pretrial 
conferences, discovery motions, and other pre- and post-trial activity.”). 
207 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
208 Id. (requiring that a judge with such knowledge “shall inform the appropriate 
authority”). The ABA’s commentary to subsection (B) plainly states that “[t]aking action to 
address known misconduct is a judge’s obligation.” Id. at cmt. 1. 
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only to “take appropriate action.”209 Thus, the ABA model code mandates reporting 
only in those cases where the judge both “knows” that a breach has occurred and 
where that breach raises a “substantial question” regarding the attorney’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness.210 In less serious cases, the model code allows for a wider 
range of responses.211 This relaxing of the reporting requirement and opening of the 
range of options comes with a much more expansive trigger for action. Rule 2.15(D) 
is triggered even if the judge lacks actual knowledge of a breach and applies to any 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct without limitation.212 The 
requirement that the judge take “appropriate action” in such cases could be satisfied 
by reporting the misconduct to state disciplinary authorities.213 However, reporting 
is certainly not required; otherwise, there would be little need for the distinctions set 
forth in subsections (B) and (D).214 Instead, for these less serious ethical breaches, 
Rule 2.15(D) contemplates situations where the judge’s action could be less than 
reporting but still be “appropriate.”215 
The ABA’s model rules of judicial ethics have been widely adopted, with 
thirty-three states adopting them almost verbatim along with the ABA’s 
commentary.216 Of those states, Kentucky and Massachusetts have provided judges 
additional guidance regarding when reporting attorney misconduct is mandated.217 
While Kentucky adopted the model rule, it altered the nature of the rule’s reporting 
requirement through a separate statute mandating reporting whenever a judge learns 
that an attorney “may have been guilty of unprofessional conduct.”218 Unlike 
																																								 																				
209 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(D) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“A judge 
who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.”). 
210 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(A) cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“This 
Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that an independent judiciary must 
vigorously endeavor to prevent.”). 
211 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(D) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. cmt. 2 (“Similarly, actions to be taken in response to information indicating that 
a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct may include 
. . . reporting the suspected violation to the appropriate authority . . . .”). 
214 Id. 
215 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) 
(noting that appropriate actions “may include but are not limited to communicating directly 
with the lawyer who may have committed the violation, or reporting the suspected violation 
to the appropriate authority or other agency or body”). 
216 See State Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_r
egulation/map.html [https://perma.cc/HNG4-UCNM]. 
217 See infra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.  
218 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26A.080 (West 2017) (“When it comes to the attention of 
any judicial officer that any justice or judge of the Court of Justice or any attorney may have 
been guilty of unprofessional conduct, he shall at once report the matter to the proper 
investigating and disciplinary authorities.”). 
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Kentucky’s rigid reporting requirement, Massachusetts provided additional 
commentary to the reporting rule providing a nonexclusive list of examples where 
reporting would be mandated.219  
Those states not adopting the ABA’s model code language have some 
substantial variation, but all, at minimum, require a judge to take some appropriate 
action when presented with evidence that a lawyer has violated an ethical rule.220 
Thus, Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, and North Carolina all require, in 
effect, that a judge must take or initiate appropriate corrective measures with respect 
to the unprofessional conduct of another judge or a lawyer.221 Maryland differs 
slightly in that it also includes a separate section directing that if other corrective 
measures are not appropriate or if the measures taken were not successful, then a 
judge shall report the misconduct.222 Illinois can also be grouped here because its 
Rule is mostly a modified ABA version. Illinois only requires appropriate 
disciplinary measure when a lawyer violates Rule 8.4 of the ABA’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct.223   
California and New York both require a judge to take action for a lawyer’s 
misconduct, but lower the threshold for such action. In New York, the lawyer must 
commit a “substantial violation” of the ethics rules to trigger the judge’s duty to take 
																																								 																				
219 Massachusetts provides the following guidance: 
 
While a measure of judgment is required in complying with this Section, a judge 
must report lawyer misconduct that, if proven and without regard to mitigation, 
would likely result in an order of suspension or disbarment, including knowingly 
making false statements of fact or law to a tribunal, suborning perjury, or engaging 
in misconduct that would constitute a serious crime. A serious crime is any felony, 
or a misdemeanor a necessary element of which includes misrepresentation, fraud, 
deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt, conspiracy, or 
solicitation of another to commit the above crimes. Section 3D(2) does not 
preclude a judge from reporting a violation of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct in circumstances where a report is not mandatory. Reporting 
a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the 
offense. If the lawyer is appearing before the judge, a judge may defer making a 
report under this Section until the matter has been concluded, but the report should 
be made as soon as practicable thereafter. However, an immediate report is 
compelled when a person will likely be injured by a delay in reporting, such as 
where the judge has knowledge that a lawyer has embezzled client or fiduciary 
funds and delay may impair the ability to recover the funds. 
 
MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 cmt. D (1999). 
220 See infra notes 221–224 and accompanying text. 
221 ALA. CODE ANN. § 45-3(B)(3) (West 2016); see also DEL. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT r. 2.15 (2015); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(3); MD. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(a); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(b)(3). 
222 See MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(b). 
223 See ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 63(B)(3)(a). 
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“appropriate action.”224 New York does not require reporting, instead “appropriate 
action” might include reporting but could also include direct communication with 
the offending lawyer.225 California has taken a different approach to judicial 
reporting of attorney misconduct. California has adopted a modified version of the 
ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics requiring “[w]henever a judge has personal 
knowledge, or concludes in a judicial decision, that a lawyer has committed 
misconduct or has violated any provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the 
judge shall take appropriate corrective action, which may include reporting the 
violation to the appropriate authority.”226 Like New York, that corrective action need 
not be reporting of the misconduct, but may include other measures such as direct 
counseling of the attorney or referring counsel to a substance abuse program.227 
However, California statutorily mandates judicial reporting of attorney misconduct 
in particular cases, such as when a court finds an attorney in contempt or when a 
reversal is premised on “misconduct, incompetent representation, or willful 
misrepresentation of an attorney.”228 
																																								 																				
224 N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS § 100.3(D)(2) (McKinney 2015). 
225 Dennis P. Glascott, Attorney Professionalism Forum: Dear Slow Burn, 80 N.Y. ST. 
B. ASS’N J. 50, 51 (March/April 2008) (“Appropriate action may include direct 
communication with the lawyer who committed the violation, or some other direct action, if 
available—and reporting the violation to the appropriate authority or agency or body.”). 
226 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3(D)(2) (West 2015). California has also 
required judges to report to the California Bar incidents of contempt, misconduct that caused 
a modification or reversal of a judgment, or any judicial sanctions against the attorney. CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7(1)–(3) (West 2016).  
227 See CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3(D)(2) cmt. (West 2015) (“Appropriate 
corrective action could include direct communication with the judge or lawyer who has 
committed the violation, other direct action, such as a confidential referral to a judicial or 
lawyer assistance program, or a report of the violation to the presiding judge, appropriate 
authority, or other agency or body.”). 
228 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7(a) (West 2016). California also mandates 
reporting under the following circumstances: 
 
(1) A final order of contempt imposed against an attorney that may involve 
grounds warranting discipline under this chapter. The court entering the final 
order shall transmit to the State Bar a copy of the relevant minutes, final order, 
and transcript, if one exists. 
(2) Whenever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is 
based in whole or in part on the misconduct, incompetent representation, or willful 
misrepresentation of an attorney. 
(3) The imposition of any judicial sanctions against an attorney, except sanctions 
for failure to make discovery or monetary sanctions of less than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000). 
(4) The imposition of any civil penalty upon an attorney pursuant to Section 8620 
of the Family Code. 
(5) A violation described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1424.5 of 
the Penal Code by a prosecuting attorney, if the court finds that the prosecuting 
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Alaska uses the ABA’s stair-stepped approach, but loosens the reporting 
requirement. Alaska requires a judge to take “appropriate action” whenever he or 
she has “information establishing a likelihood that a lawyer has violated” an ethics 
rule.229 A judge’s reporting obligation is triggered by information establishing a 
“likelihood” that a lawyer violated any ethics “by an act of dishonesty, obstruction 
of justice, or breach of fiduciary duty.”230 However, that obligation is negated if the 
judge “reasonably believes that the misconduct has been or will otherwise be 
reported.”231 While the Code provides judges with a fair degree of discretion as to 
when to report and how to react to misconduct, the commentary makes clear that the 
judge must always “respond reasonably.”232 
Finally, Idaho and Washington have the most lenient reporting requirements. 
Idaho merely encourages judges “to bring instances of unprofessional conduct by 
judges or lawyers to their attention in order to provide them opportunities to correct 
their errors without disciplinary proceedings.”233 Reporting is only suggested “when 
no such remedial action is promptly undertaken, or if the violations are flagrant or 
repeated.”234 Thus, even when the violation is flagrant or repeated, Idaho still uses 
the permissive language “should.”235 Washington’s Canon also uses the permissive 
language “should” regarding a judge’s reporting obligation, but explains in the 
commentary that the state should not have to force judges to report; judges should 
want to report.236 Washington even loosens the requirement for judicial reactions to 
																																								 																				
attorney acted in bad faith and the impact of the violation contributed to a guilty 
verdict, guilty or nolo contendere plea, or, if identified before conclusion of trial, 
seriously limited the ability of a defendant to present a defense. 
 
Id. 
229 AK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) (West 2015). 
230 Id.  
231 Id.  
232 Id. at cmt. (“Appropriate action will vary with particular situations and with 
particular individuals. There will generally be a range of reasonable responses available to 
the judge who learns of misconduct. However, a judge who learns of misconduct must 
respond reasonably. For example, the judge may not ‘respond’ by explicitly or implicitly 
condoning the misconduct.”). 
233 IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D) (2013). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 The commentary states:  
(1) Judges are not required to report the misconduct of other judges or lawyers. 
Self regulation of the legal and judicial professions, however, creates an 
aspiration that judicial officers report misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary 
authority when they know of a serious violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
or the Rules of Professional Conduct. An apparently isolated violation may 
indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary violation can uncover. 
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less serious ethical lapses, only directing that judges “should take appropriate 
action.”237 
As noted in a number of codes commentaries, judges have substantial 
discretion in determining what action is “appropriate” short of reporting. Short of 
the fairly obvious advice that “ignoring or denying known misconduct” is not 
appropriate, the codes and their commentary provide little direct guidance regarding 
the scope of appropriate actions.238 The commentary to the Canons of Judicial 
Conduct suggests that such action could include “direct communication” with the 
offending lawyer, “other direct action if available,” and reporting the violation to the 
appropriate authority.239 As Alaska noted in its commentary, what is appropriate 
“will vary,” but within that variance judges are required to “respond reasonably.”240 
California, like nearly every state, limits appropriate action to “direct action”—
either direct communication with the offending lawyer or “other direct action, such 
as a confidential referral to a judicial or lawyer assistance program.”241 Florida has 
gone further, making plain that when the judge is faced with “minor” conduct, he or 
																																								 																				
Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to 
discover the offense. 
(2) While judges are not obliged to report every violation of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct or the Rules of Professional Conduct, the failure to report may undermine 
the public confidence in [the] legal profession and the judiciary. A measure of 
judgment is, therefore, required in deciding whether to report a violation. The term 
“substantial” refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum 
of evidence of which the judge is aware. A report should be made when a judge 
or lawyer’s conduct raises a serious question as to the honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a judge or lawyer. 
WA. STAT. ANN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15 cmt. 1–2 (West 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
237 Id. at r. 2.15(D). 
238 See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15 cmt 1 (West 2016) (“Ignoring 
or denying known misconduct among one’s judicial colleagues or members of the legal 
profession undermines a judge’s responsibility to participate in efforts to ensure public 
respect for the justice system.”). 
239 Abramson, supra note 7, at 772. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT r. 2.15 cmt 2 (West 2016) (“Similarly, actions to be taken in response to 
information indicating that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct may include but are not limited to communicating directly with the lawyer who may 
have committed the violation, or reporting the suspected violation to the appropriate 
authority or other agency or body.”). 
240 AK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) cmt. (West 2016) (“Appropriate 
action will vary with particular situations and with particular individuals. There will 
generally be a range of reasonable responses available to the judge who learns of misconduct. 
However, a judge who learns of misconduct must respond reasonably. For example, the 
judge may not ‘respond’ by explicitly or implicitly condoning the misconduct.”). 
241 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3(D)(2) cmt. (West 2016). 
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she is limited to addressing it “solely by direct communication with the offender” 
while serious violations must be reported.242 Within the context of direct action, 
Ohio suggests that communication with “a supervisor, partner, or colleague” is a 
method of correcting attorney unethical conduct.243 Maryland uses the term 
“appropriate corrective measures,” rather than appropriate action signifying that the 
action should be directed at rehabilitation rather than punishment.244 The 
commentary notes that judges have a “wide range of options to deal with 
unprofessional conduct,” but suggests “direct communication,” “other direct action 
if available,” or a “private admonition or referral to a bar association counseling 
service.”245  
Given the nearly universal ethical obligation to either report serious misconduct 
or to take other “appropriate action,” a judge does not comply with those obligations 
by addressing attorney misconduct through a benchslap. As noted, benchslaps are 
often a reaction to attorney ethical misconduct. That misconduct accordingly 
triggers one of two responses—reporting to the appropriate authorities or other 
appropriate action. The benchslap complies with neither requirement. 
First, if the attorney misconduct is sufficiently serious, a judge is obligated to 
report that misconduct to the proper authority for investigation and possible formal 
discipline. While judges possess the inherent authority to discipline attorney 
misconduct, the exercise of that inherent authority to address attorney misconduct 
through less formal measures such as in-chambers discussions, written reprimands, 
or sanctions orders, is not a substitute for formal discipline.246 Thus, even if the 
breach of a judges’ duty of decorum247 and the serious due process issues presented 
																																								 																				
242 FLA. STAT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D) cmt. D (West 2016). 
243 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) cmt. 2 (West 2015) (“A judge who 
does not have actual knowledge, but who receives information indicating a substantial 
likelihood that another judge or a lawyer has committed misconduct, should take appropriate 
action. Appropriate action may include, but is not limited to, communicating directly with 
the judge or lawyer involved, communicating with a supervisor, partner, or colleague, or 
reporting the suspected violation to the appropriate disciplinary authority.”). 
244 MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 16-813 r. 2.15(a) (West 2016). 
245 Id. at § 16-813 r. 2.15 cmt. 1 (“Permitting a judge to take ‘corrective’ measures 
gives the judge a wide range of options to deal with unprofessional conduct. Appropriate 
corrective measures may include direct communication with the judge or lawyer who is 
believed to have committed the violation or other direct action if available. There may be 
instances of professional misconduct that would warrant a private admonition or referral to 
a bar association counseling service.”). 
246 See ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS 2 (1986), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
professional_responsibility/sanction_standards.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNR3-
85UH] (noting that the ABA Committee has criticized judges for taking the position that 
“there is no such need [to initiate the disciplinary process] and that errant behavior of lawyers 
can be remedied solely by use of contempt proceedings and other alternative means”). 
247 See infra Part III.B. 
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by benchslaps248 could be ignored, a benchslap cannot be an appropriate method, 
standing alone, to address serious ethical breaches. 
Second, even for those breaches for which reporting is not mandated, a judge 
is still obligated to take “appropriate action.”249 The thread running through the 
differently worded canons and commentary is that such action is to be direct, 
corrective, and often times private. Given this understanding of appropriateness, 
there is nothing appropriate about a judicial benchslap. Instead of a private 
admonishment, a benchslap is designed to be public. In fact, it gains its power only 
from the shaming effect emanating from the public humiliation. It seeks to require 
future compliance with ethical norms not through direct communication and 
counseling with the attorney but indirectly through the public shaming and 
humiliation.   
Yet, no judicial code of ethics even hints that it is appropriate for a judge to 
correct attorney misconduct through public humiliation. Instead, judges are directed 
to do the exact opposite and to “avoid the imposition of humiliating acts or 
discipline.”250 And, that public humiliation aspect adds nothing to ensuring future 
compliance given the ineffectiveness of public shaming as a corrective and deterrent 
strategy.251 Yet, despite the ethical issues raised by benchslaps, there has been little 
in terms of reprimands for this conduct. The reason for this lax enforcement is likely 
two-fold and complimentary. First, lawyers and other judges have a poor track 
																																								 																				
248 See infra Part III.C. 
249 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(D) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); Abramson, 
supra note 7, at 771–78. 
250 See, e.g., MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(9) (West 2015) (“A judge 
should adopt the usual and accepted methods of doing justice; avoid the imposition of 
humiliating acts or discipline, not authorized by law in sentencing and endeavor to conform 
to a reasonable standard of punishment and not seek popularity or publicity either by 
exceptional severity or undue leniency.”). 
251 In fact as Professor Massaro has noted, public shaming as a penalty may make 
recidivism more likely not less: 
 
Fourth, the impact of stigmatization on an offender’s post-shaming behavior 
is difficult to predict, as the psychological materials and the unresolved 
controversy about labeling theory—the claim that labeling an offender “deviant” 
produces secondary deviance or criminal acts—prove.  Consider ways in which a 
person who is, or feels, shamed may respond: angrily (defending against the 
shame) or even violently. In other words, we already know that shaming does not 
always produce permanent (or even temporary) pained withdrawal. Shaming a 
person, especially an adult, instead may produce more norm deviance and even 
physical violence. 
 
Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 645, 694 (1997) (citations omitted). 
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record of reporting judges’ ethical lapses.252 Compounding that problem is the lack 
of clear guidance in judicial ethics codes regarding the propriety of addressing 
lawyers’ misconduct through benchslaps.253  
Further, any method of attorney discipline that bullies weaker parties into 
compliance, brings the judiciary’s reputation for evenhandedness and the fair 
administration of justice into disrepute, and raises questions about the judge’s own 
ethical obligations cannot possibly be considered appropriate. As noted, the public 
leveraging of the disparate power relationship between attorney and judge that the 
benchslap represents has consequences beyond the immediate correction of one 
attorney’s misconduct. As the research suggests, the use of such power has 
immediate psychological and physiological consequences, not only for the attorney 
victim, but also for innocent bystanders.254 Even the judges who issue the benchslap 
can suffer an erosion of the compassionate empathy that is critical to the fair 
administration of justice.255 And, it is not only the judge and the benchslapped 
attorney who is likely to feel its effects. The psychological effects of bullying are 
felt by not only by the instigator and victim but by the innocent bystanders as well 
as they fret over when they may fall victim next. Given those consequences for the 
parties and for the system of justice, this method of ethical enforcement is simply 
not “appropriate.” 
Legal education’s use of the Socratic Method and its reputation as a chamber 
of horrors in which students are humiliated and “toughened up” for the rough and 
tumble of legal practice does not justify addressing attorney misconduct through 
benchslaps. The popular culture image that comes to mind of this version of legal 
education is Professor Kingsfield offering Mr. Hart a dime and suggesting “call your 
mother, and tell her there is serious doubt about your becoming a lawyer.”256 To the 
extent that Professor Kingsfield ever represented the true face of legal education, 
that model of instruction is increasingly being set aside. Instead, the “humanizing 
legal education” movement seeks to correct the harmful effects of legal education 
on students’ physical and mental well-being.257 There is a growing acknowledgment 
																																								 																				
252 See Abramson, supra note 7, at 753 (noting the stigma associated with reporting 
misconduct); Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting, supra note 5, at 537 (noting the “conventional 
wisdom” that judges’ duty to report misconduct “often is ignored”). 
253 See infra Part IV.B. 
254 See supra Part II.A. 
255 See Gini, Pozzoli, & Hauser, supra note 1, at 604. 
256 THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973). 
257 Michael Hunter Schwartz, Humanizing Legal Education: An Introduction to a 
Symposium Whose Time Came, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 235–36 (2008). Professor Schwartz 
notes that “while law students come to law school with similar levels of depression, anxiety, 
and substance abuse as other graduate students, by the end of their first year of legal 
education, law students’ level of depression, anxiety and substance abuse are significantly 
greater.” Id. at 235.  
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that law professors serve as important “models of civility.”258 In fact, this role 
modeling function is listed among the attributes of the nation’s best law 
professors.259 In describing one of the “best law professors,” one student noted “the 
absence of mocking and humiliation in his classes, in contrast to some other courses 
. . . .”260 Just as isolated Professor Kingfields are increasingly told that such methods 
are counterproductive and should yield to modern best practices, so too must 
benchslapping judges be reminded that their admonishment of unprofessional and 
unethical conduct through unprofessional benchslaps is as unethical as it is 
counterproductive. 
 
B.  Benchslaps as Breaches of Judges’ Duty of Decorum 
 
Not only does the benchslap violate the judge’s duty to report misconduct or to 
take other appropriate action, but the benchslap also violates the judge’s duty of 
decorum. Like the lawyers appearing in court, judges too are ethically bound to 
conduct themselves with a level of decorum and professionalism befitting the 
somber and serious work of the justice system. Since 1924 in its former Canons of 
Judicial Ethics, the ABA has recommended rules requiring judicial decorum.261 The 
most recent version of this duty is the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
requiring judges to “be patient, dignified, and courteous” to everyone associated 
with the work of the court, specifically to the appearing lawyers.262 Model Rule 2.8 
has been widely adopted nearly verbatim.263 Importantly, this rule mandates judges 
																																								 																				
258 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 157–58 (2007) (noting that some professors “emphasize the importance 
of serving as exemplars of lawyer professionalism”). 
259 MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ ET AL., WHAT THE BEST LAW TEACHERS DO 114 
(2013) (“Most of the teachers we studied focus a significant part of their teaching, mentoring, 
and modeling on professionalism.”). 
260 Id. at 86. 
261 See Douglas R. Richmond, Bullies on the Bench, 72 LA. L. REV. 325, 331–32 (2012) 
(summarizing the history of the ABA’s guidance on judicial decorum from earlier versions 
of the canons of judicial ethics requiring that judges “act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” to the current 
requirement in Rule 2.8’s decorum mandate). 
262 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A judge shall 
be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court 
officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require 
similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s 
discretion and control.”). 
263 See ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); ARK. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 3(B)(4) (West 
2015); COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT r. 2.8(b) (West 2015); D.C. RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); 
DEL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3(B)(4) (West 2015); GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); HAW. 
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to “require similar conduct” of the appearing lawyers—thus linking the lawyer’s 
duty of decorum with the judge’s own duty.264   
In whatever their iteration, judicial decorum requires judges to rise above the 
fray and to act with the dignity consistent with their position. As noted by New 
York’s rules of trial court judges, a judge “should be the exemplar of dignity and 
impartiality. He shall suppress his personal predilections, control his temper and 
emotions, and otherwise avoid conduct on his part which tends to demean the 
proceedings or to undermine his authority in the courtroom.”265 Hawai‘i has gone so 
far as to create a list of “Principles of Professionalism for Hawai‘i Judges,”266 which, 
while not creating additional standards for discipline purposes “should, however, be 
followed by all judges in the State of Hawai‘i.”267 In general, those principles place 
an obligation on judges to act courteously in their interactions with attorneys 
appearing before them in both their written and oral communications.268 
																																								 																				
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(b) (West 2015); ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 
63(A)(3) (West 2015); IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); KAN. CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3(B)(4) (West 2015); ME. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); MD. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 18-102.8(b) (West 2015); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8 
(B) (West 2015); MONT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); NEV. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 
2015); N.Y. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(3) (McKinney 2015); N.D. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) 
(West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, App. 1-a, r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); OR. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.7(B) (West 2015); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 
2015); TENN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(4) (West 2015); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 
2015); WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015); WYO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8(B) (West 2015). 
264 MODEL CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
265 N.Y. CT. R. § 700.5 (McKinney 2016). 
266 HAW. R. S. CT. Ex. B-1 (2015). 
267 HAW. R. S. CT. Ex. B-1 Preamble (2015). 
268 In relevant part, those principles require: 
  
1. A judge should be courteous, respectful and civil to lawyers, parties, 
witnesses, court personnel, and all other participants in the legal process. 
. . . 
9. A judge should not employ hostile, demeaning or humiliating language in 
opinions or in written or oral communications with other judges, lawyers, 
parties, witnesses or court personnel. 
. . . 
15. A judge should be courteous and respectful in opinions, ever mindful that a 
position articulated by another judge is the result of that judge’s earnest 
effort to interpret the law and the facts correctly. 
 
HAW. R. S. CT. Ex. B-1 (2015). 
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These requirements of judicial decorum are not mere exercises in “political 
correctness” or forced niceness. Instead, judges acting without the required level of 
decorum have a direct negative effect on the judicial process. If judges have 
unchecked ability to belittle counsel who appear before the court, it becomes 
particularly difficult to hold those lawyers to their ethical obligation of decorum 
while not doing so for the judge.269 But, more importantly, the injudicious use of 
judicial power erodes the public’s already weakened perception of the judiciary as 
fair, balanced, and trustworthy.270 
Despite the institutional importance of judicial decorum, its outer boundary has 
been difficult to detect. Judges are advised to avoid needless humor in both their 
courtroom presence and judicial writing as it is often “neither judicial nor 
humorous.”271 As the Kansas Supreme Court noted, the ABA’s 1924 canons of 
judicial ethics suggested that judges should be more “learned than witty” and 
reminded judges that “integrity is their portion and proper virtue.”272 Beyond 
avoiding judicial “wisecracking,” few general rules can be gleaned. Judges are to 
avoid obscene language during the course of their official duties.273 Judicial name-
																																								 																				
269 Edward Cashman, From the Bench: Civility as a Tool of Persuasion, 30 VT. B. J. & 
L. DIG., Summer 2004, at 8 (“Civility starts with the trial judge. The civility index of any 
county bar association depends upon the example of civility practiced by the judge. The 
judge’s example sets the expectation for the bar.”); Catherine Thérèse Clarke, Missed 
Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 1005 (1991) (“Legal etiquette is a 
two-way street.”). 
270 In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676, 685 (Kan. 1975) (“[A judge] is expected to act in a 
manner inspiring confidence that even-handed treatment is afforded to everyone coming into 
contact with the judicial system.”); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 
1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct 
that creates the appearances of impropriety.”); Tobin A. Sparling, Through Different Lenses: 
Using Psychology to Assess Popular Criticism of the Judiciary from the Public’s 
Perspective, 19 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 471, 500 (2010) (explaining how judicial 
temperament has real consequences regarding the public’s perception of the judiciary as fair, 
trustworthy, and effective).   
271 George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing, for Four New Judges, 21 ARK. 
L. REV. 197, 210 (1967); Richard H. Underwood, What Gets Judges in Trouble, 23 J. NAT’L. 
ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 101, 129 (2003) (recommending that judges “leave the stupid 
jokes and wisecracks to the law professors. No one expects anything better from them 
anyway.”). However, as Judge Lebovits noted, Justice Smith eventually altered his view on 
judicial humor. Gerald Lebovits, Judicial Jesting: Judicious?, 75 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 64, 64 
n.2 (2003). 
272 In re Rome, 542 P.2d at 685 (quoting from “Ancient Precedents” contained in the 
1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics). 
273 In re Bartie, 138 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 2004) (affirming a violation of 
Canon 3(B)(4) and recommendation to review and permanently bar judge from holding 
judicial office where “the nature and frequency of the extremely obscene language employed 
by [the judge] are, standing alone, sufficient to warrant removal”). 
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calling, particularly when directed towards litigants, has landed judges in ethical 
trouble.274   
The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in In re Rome275 illustrates what judges 
can do to run afoul of the duty of decorum. There, a criminal defendant was 
convicted of prostitution and in placing her on probation for two years, the judge 
issued a “Memorandum Decision” written in poetic form and which called her a 
“young whore” and referred to her in other ways so as to make her “someone to be 
laughed at and her plight found amusing.”276 The Kansas Supreme Court recognized 
that a judge has “discretion to write an opinion the way he chooses but that discretion 
																																								 																				
274 It is difficult to square the courts’ condemnation of name-calling against their 
inattention to the written benchslap. Yet, the disparate treatment exists. In re Eiler, 236 P.3d 
873, 879 (Wash. 2010) (suspending a judge for five days for a breach of decorum based on 
calling pro se litigants “idiot,” “young and stupid,” and interrupting them in “a rude, 
impatient, and undignified manner”); see also Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 979 N.E.2d 
289, 295 (Ohio 2012) (suspending judge for six months for, among other things, telling a 
defendant “[y]ou have a bad case of D.H. Dickheaditis” and “[y]ou can’t keep continuing to 
screw off or you’ll be like the rest of the dickheads at the Stark County Jail”); Megan Zavieh, 
Judge Threatens to Strangle Lawyer in Death Penalty Case, Calls Defendant a “Carcass,” 
LAWYERIST (Aug. 28, 2013), https://lawyerist.com/69462/judge-behaving-badly/ 
[https://perma.cc/X2XJ-PMBJ] (recounting the public reprimand of a Kentucky judge who 
referred to a defendant as a “carcass”). 
275 542 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1975). 
276 Id. at 685. The poetic order included the following: 
 
On January 30th, 1974, 
This lass agreed to work as a whore. 
Her great mistake, as was to unfold, 
Was the enticing of a cop named Harold. 
Unknown to __, this officer, surnamed Harris, 
Was duty-bent on ____’s lot to embarrass. 
At the Brass Rail they met, 
And for twenty dollars the trick was all set. 
 . . .  
On February 26, 1974, 
This State of Kansas tried this young whore. 
  . . .  
The judge showed mercy and __ was free, 
But back to the street she could not flee. 
The fine she’d pay while out on parole, 
But not from men she used to cajole. 
From her ancient profession she’d been busted, 
And to society’s rules she must be adjusted. 
If from all of this a moral doth unfurl, 
It is that Pimps do not protect the working girl! 
 
Id. at 680–81. 
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must be exercised within the framework of the judicial code generally and canon 3 
A. (3) in particular.”277 Finding a violation of the judge’s duty of decorum, the court 
noted that “[j]udges simply should not ‘wisecrack’ at the expense of anyone 
connected with a judicial proceeding who is not in a position to reply.”278 
Courts enforcing the duty of decorum have sent mixed signals, recognizing the 
systemic importance of the rule and at the same time take a somewhat lax attitude 
regarding its enforcement. Some judges have been able to avoid removal from office 
for repeated breaches of decorum when they agree to seek assistance to modify their 
behavior, most commonly agreeing to “anger management” counseling.279 In 
general, judicial conduct committees and courts are generally reluctant to sanction 
judges for spontaneous statements made from the bench.280 The West Virginia 
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Hamrick281 is a prime example of this lax 
enforcement. There, the court found no breach of the family law master’s duty of 
decorum where the master yelled at the pro se litigant and banged his gavel so loudly 
that it brought the bailiff into the room to make sure there was no danger.282 While 
the court did not “condone” the conduct, it found that it did not violate decorum 
because it was a reaction to the litigant’s own behavior.283 That was too much for 
the concurring justice who wrote separately because he thought “the majority was 
too hard on” the judge and “too easy on” the litigant.284 
While there are no reported cases admonishing a judge under the duty of 
decorum for issuing the benchslaps as described above, that does not detract from 
the fairly plain conclusion that the orders and opinions raise serious breach of 
decorum issues. At worst, they are clear violations and at best, they are close enough 
to the line that review by judicial ethics commissions would be warranted. There is 
little “patient, dignified, or courteous” about the former-Judge Kent suggesting that 
the lawyers wrote their pleadings in “crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper 
place mats,” Judge Sparks’s invitation to a “kindergarten party,” Judge Hughes 
“Order on Ineptitude,” or Judge Posner’s inclusion of a picture of an attorney with 
																																								 																				
277 Id. at 684. 
278 Id. at 685; see supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
279 See, e.g., In re Sloop, 946 So.2d 1046, 1057–58 (Fla. 2007) (noting examples of 
lesser penalties when counseling was agreed to).  
280 See, e.g., In re Grant, No. 4952-F-131, 2006 WL 6084806, at *3 (Wash. Com. Jud. 
Cond. Aug. 4, 2006) (“Ordinarily, a spontaneous, well-intentioned and intrinsically 
innocuous comment made by a judge from the bench—even though misplaced—would not 
by itself amount to judicial misconduct deserving of public sanctions. To preserve and 
respect judicial independence, judges should be afforded some measure of human 
fallibility.”). 
281 512 S.E.2d 870 (W.Va. 1998). 
282 Id. at 871.  
283 Id. (finding that a judge did not breach decorum despite brusquely yelling at a 
litigant because it was in response to litigant’s filing of a “false claim,” attempting “to evade 
answers,” and misrepresenting facts to the judge). 
284 Id. at 873 (Maynard, J., concurring). 
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his head in the sand in a published decision. The fact these benchslaps were written 
makes them even more indecorous. A slip of the judicial tongue during an exchange 
with counsel in court could be excused given the rapid-fire nature of courtroom 
proceedings. However, these written opinions and orders are apparently the result of 
thoughtful reflection. However justifiable the frustration with the attorneys’ 
misconduct, the writing process should have allowed that frustration to subside and 
the judges’ sense of decorum to rise to allow them to address the attorneys’ failings 
in a more productive and dignified way. One is left to wonder in each of these cases: 
if this is what was published, how bad were the first drafts? 
Not only are these orders and opinions likely violations under the plain 
understanding of Rule 2.8, but each is eerily like the behavior that led the Kansas 
Supreme Court to sanction the judge in In re Rome.285 Judge Rome attempted to 
justify the humorous and mocking tone in his order as a way of combating the 
problem of prostitution in Hutchison, Kansas and “jolt[ing]” the town’s red light 
district, “more particularly, the pimps” into compliance with the state’s prostitution 
laws.286 Certainly the notoriety of the initial maximum sentence and the widespread 
dissemination of the offending order served that purpose. Everyone in Hutchinson 
knew that Judge Rome was getting tough on prostitution.287 However, that intent did 
not excuse the decorum violation. Likewise, the judges issuing benchslaps directed 
at counsel are certainly using them to put lawyers on notice that they are getting 
tough on whatever ethical violations prompted the judicial rebuke. No one doubts 
that judges should confront attorney misconduct. The enforcement of ethical and 
professionalism norms by judges is a vital and mandatory component of the self-
regulation of attorney ethics. But, their service to enforcement cannot justify the 
breach of decorum. Whatever good may come from benchslaps, the conclusion that 
they tread too closely to the line of decorum, if not over, is inescapable. The fact 
benchslaps even approach the line should be reason enough to avoid them. That they 
potentially discredit the judiciary and lead to a coarsening and not a refinement of 
judicial and lawyer ethics and professionalism are all the more reasons why the 
practice offends the judge’s duty to act with decorum.   
The conclusion that these benchslaps are undignified is supported by at least 
one other judge’s own discomfort with the practice. While Chief Judge Jones 
neglected to use the words “your order violates your duty of decorum” in her email 
to Judge Sparks, her implication is clear. Notwithstanding the likely violation, Judge 
Sparks still felt free to issue such orders and Judge Jones felt unrequired to report 
his likely violations. His actions and her lack of reporting are not proof that the 
benchslap did not violate decorum. Instead, the actions of judges like Judge Sparks 
and the reluctance of judges like Chief Judge Jones to bring formal complaints are 
strong support for the need to clarify the model rules of judicial ethics to make clear 
that such behavior crosses an ethical line.288 
																																								 																				
285 In re Rome, 542 P.2d at 685. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 See infra part IV.B. 
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C.  Benchslaps as Breaches of Attorneys’ Due Process Rights 
 
Putting aside judges’ ethics obligations to take appropriate action when faced 
with attorney misconduct and to act with decorum when doing so, the practice of 
issuing judicial benchslaps raises serious due process concerns for the slapped 
attorneys. In his recent article, Professor Richmond explored the ability of lawyers 
to remove a judge’s negative comments about their performance from an order or 
decision.289 He noted that courts universally agree that a lawyer has no right to appeal 
a decision in which the court includes “routine judicial commentary.”290 Conversely, 
when a court order finds and sanctions an attorney for some misconduct, there is no 
doubt that the attorney may appeal.291 However, the issue becomes more complex 
when the court’s order falls short of issuing a sanction but includes language that 
might affect an attorney’s reputation.292 In short, there is much dispute regarding 
whether an attorney has a right to appeal a lower court’s benchslap. 
The question of whether an attorney’s reputational interest can invoke appellate 
jurisdiction has generated three distinct answers: never, sometimes, and most of the 
time.293 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stands alone in finding 
																																								 																				
289 Richmond, supra note 15, at 741–46. 
290 Id. at 760. 
291 Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting 
that the “imposition of a sanction on an attorney is universally regarded as an order” that is 
appealable). The court furthered noted that whether such a mid-case order is immediately 
appealable on an interlocutory basis is a matter of some disagreement. Id. at 90 n.3. 
292 The reputational damage from a benchslap has a hearty durability. For example, a 
Google search for David “Mac” McKeand, the attorney who Judge Posner compared to an 
ostrich in Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2011), yields as its first 
result a six-year old Blog post on Above the Law about the benchslap. Search Results for a 
Search of David Mac McKeand, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com [https://perma.cc/HB4V-
7UQR] (highlighting this particular article: David Lat, A Reverse Benschslap? Chastised 
Lawyer Lashes Out at Judge Posner, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:06 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/11/a-reverse-benchslap-chastised-lawyer-lashes-out-at-judge-
posner/ [https://perma.cc/P7QA-EJ7T]). See also MATTHEW A. BOWERS, BENCHSLAPPED: 
PUBLICLY HUMILIATING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 10–11 (2d ed. 2013) (noting that because of 
benchslaps “[r]eputations are being tarnished. Clients are being lost. Career prospects are 
being crushed.”). Further, the potential damage to an attorney’s reputation is enough that at 
least one company is marketing strategies to eliminate the internet stain of a benchslap. See 
Scott Holcomb, Virtual Reputation Management for Lawyers & Law Firms, 
http://www.androvett.com/clientuploads/advertising-marketing-white-papers/white-paper-
pdf-files/virtual-reputation-management-for-lawyers-and-law-firms-by-scott-holcomb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UB3M-DW96] (noting that “[l]awyers and law firms face many online 
reputation challenges, including: . . . Negative mentions in law-related blogs, such as Above 
the Law’s ‘Bench Slap of the Day’”). 
293 In fact, that disagreement extends even to the categories into which the circuits fall. 
The Tenth Circuit classified the split as never, always, and “only if . . . ‘expressly classified 
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that reputational interests, standing alone, can never justify an appeal.294 In the 
absence of some monetary sanction, the Seventh Circuit will not entertain such 
appeals; instead, it finds them not to be a “final decision” under section 1291’s grant 
of appellate jurisdiction.295 Courts allowing such appeals generally require that the 
lower court’s order go beyond merely identifying attorney misconduct, but include 
some formal statement that the identification of the attorney’s misdeeds is intended 
to serve as a formal reprimand.296 These courts essentially allow the lower court to 
determine the appealability of a benchslap. Simply by avoiding certain formal magic 
words classifying the benchslap as a formal reprimand, a lower court can insulate 
itself from higher review. The final category, most of the time, is the broadest in that 
those courts will allow an attorney to appeal based on the reputational harm 
associated with the benchslap alone.297 This approach jettisons the requirements that 
the benchslap come with monetary sanctions or be specifically designated as a 
reprimand. However, as noted by Professor Richmond, it does not represent an 
“always appealable” position.298 Instead, even this most liberal approach requires 
the lower court to make “specific findings of misconduct to support an appeal.”299 
In addition to those three approaches, even the never appealable jurisdiction would 
permit review of a written judicial scolding through mandamus procedures.300 
																																								 																				
as a reprimand.’” Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2003). 
Professor Richmond took issue with those classifications and instead adopted his own 
taxonomy: “conservative,” “middle ground,” and “supposed liberal” approaches. Richmond, 
supra note 15, at 764–81. A student author created a third classification system: “monetary 
sanctions only,” “sanctions that could damage an attorney’s professional reputation,” and 
“sanctions that are considered formal.” Carla Pasquale, Note, Scolded: Can an Attorney 
Appeal a District Court’s Order Finding Professional Misconduct?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
219, 230–42 (2008). This Article has chosen never, sometimes, and most of the time; not to 
create further confusion but because it more accurately reflects the uncertainty that a lawyer 
faces when attempting to access the appellate system to right an alleged reputational wrong. 
294 Butler, 348 F.3d at 1167 (noting that the Seventh Circuit is “the only circuit falling 
into the first category”); Richmond, supra note 15, at 764–71 (labeling this the 
“conservative” approach); Pasquale, supra note 293, at 230–33.  
295 Butler, 348 F.3d at 1167. 
296 Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(“Sanctions are not limited to monetary imposts.”); see also Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 
179 F.3d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that “Words alone may suffice if they are 
expressly identified as a reprimand.” (quoting with approval the First Circuit’s decision in 
Williams, 156 F.3d at 91–92)). 
297 Butler, 348 F.3d at 1167. 
298 Richmond, supra note 15, at 778.  
299 Id.  
300 Williams, 156 F.3d at 92 (“Our holding does not leave a chastised attorney 
remediless. A lawyer is free to petition for a writ of mandamus, and request that offending 
commentary be expunged from the public record.” (citation omitted)). 
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However, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is rarely granted by reviewing 
courts.301 Thus, it serves as a “slender reed on which to lean for appellate review.”302 
Accordingly, all three approaches to the appealability of benchslaps allow the 
lower court to control whether the attorney has a right to appeal. By refraining from 
issuing a monetary sanction, strategically declining to formally label the benchslap 
as a reprimand, or reciting what the lawyer did, but coming just short of connecting 
the conduct to a specific ethical violation, the benchslap-inclined judge can assure 
him or herself that the attorney will have no direct and mandatory right to have the 
commentary reviewed and removed from the order.303 In this sense, courts can use 
such orders as a way to enforce ethical and professional norms without the 
inconvenience of providing an avenue for the wrongly chastised attorney to have his 
or her complaint heard and the record corrected. The lower court decides to 
benchslap an attorney, and that benchslap remains both on the books and in the 
electronic ether for all time without response. 
A central component of any sanction system must be a reasonable avenue for 
mandatory review and correction of errors. The three approaches to appealability of 
lower court benchslaps disqualify them from being part of such a system. Yet, some 
judges use the less formal but more public benchslap as opposed to the private, 
formal, and serious reprimand proceedings before attorney ethics commissions.304 
And, while discretionary mandamus is available to correct some flagrant violations, 
its flaw is that it is discretionary and rarely granted.305 Combining the public shaming 
at the core of the benchslap and the lack of serious and certain due process 
protections, it is easy to conclude that the benchslap is not an “appropriate” action 
for a judge to take when learning of potential or even actual attorney misconduct. 
Thus, the rules on judicial conduct should be modified to give clear guidance to 
judges and disciplinary committees that judicial benchslapping violates both the 
judge’s twin duties of decorum and to take appropriate action to address attorney 
misconduct.  
																																								 																				
301 See Cheney v. U.S. District Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (noting that 
mandamus “is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes”). 
302 Williams, 156 F.3d at 99 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
303 Id. (“Under the majority’s view, it is possible for a judge to harshly censure or 
chastise the lawyer in a published opinion and intend to punish but avoid appellate review. 
The trial judge can escape appellate review of an unfounded or intemperate censure merely 
by refraining from labeling the public reprimand as an order or decree.”). 
304 Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting, supra note 5, at 566 (noting that the attorney 
disciplinary process is largely confidential until the disciplinary board has sufficient evidence 
to file a complaint but that “[j]udicial opinions notifying the world that a particular lawyer is 
being reported, and often identifying the reasons for the referral, undercut the 
privacy/reputation rationale of the disciplinary system”). However, at least one author 
suggested that the lack of due process makes the issuance of such “informal sanctions” more 
efficient. Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney 
Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1453 (2004) 
(“[U]nlike traditional sanctions, informal sanctions are more efficient because they do not 
entail an adherence to due process requirements.”). 
305 See Richmond, supra note 15 , at 758–59. 
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IV.  STOPPING THE SLAP: CLARIFYING CODES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT TO MAKE 
THE BENCHSLAP AN “INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSE” TO ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT 
AND A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF DECORUM 
 
While it is plain to see that the benchslap is not an appropriate response to 
attorney ethical and professional failings, the reform of that problem must be 
carefully calibrated. Any solution must preserve the judiciary’s central role in 
regulating and correcting attorney conduct. Generally speaking, judges, with 
exceptions noted here, perform this important work with the careful skill and 
judgment required. Not only are judges for the most part doing good work in this 
area, but their work is vitally needed. Judges sit on the front lines of legal practice. 
This vantage point allows them to observe attorneys in action and unguarded. Thus, 
they are in the best position to identify and correct attorney misdeeds before they 
take on truly serious proportions. Not only that, but judges with their vast reservoirs 
of knowledge and experience are best positioned to act as elder statesmen and 
counsel junior and less experienced wayward lawyers. 
However, the attempts to correct attorney misconduct via the benchslap 
discredits the judiciary’s important role in ensuring an ethical and professional bar. 
Further, they erode the public’s trust in both the legal profession and the judiciary. 
The open mocking and belittling of lawyers helps no one. Instead, we need to keep 
the judges in the process of regulating attorney conduct, but remove this increasingly 
popular sport of benchslapping from that process.   
 
A.  Bringing a Tank to a “Slap Fight”: Reforms that Do More Harm than Good 
 
As noted above, benchslaps implicate three main problems: (1) their 
indecorous and bullying nature damage the reputation of the attorneys at whom they 
are directed; (2) they represent an abdication of the judge’s ethical duty to take 
appropriate action when faced with attorney misconduct; and (3) there are 
exceedingly narrow avenues to appeal them. Thus, to remedy and deter their 
issuance, solutions centered on those concerns could be crafted. However, as 
suggested below, certain solutions that meet those flaws head-on, such as altering 
judicial immunity, increasing appeal rights, and mandating reporting of all attorney 
misconduct would likely do more harm than good. Given those dangers, a more 
modest approach must be taken to preserve the best of the current system while 
eliminating the worst. 
If a benchslap is simply viewed as raw judicial bullying, then a potential 
solution would be to modify the nearly impenetrable cloak of judicial immunity to 
allow the attorney-victims to sue the benchslapping judge.306 Thus, a judge could be 
																																								 																				
306 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–29 (1988) (noting that judge’s enjoy a 
“sweeping form of immunity” to prevent judges from being liable for their judicial acts to 
avoid “the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious”). 
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subject to civil liability for the career damaging benchslaps. Or, like Professor 
Yamada has tried to create in the employment context, a new statutory right of action 
could be created providing civil remedies for judicial bullying.307 In theory, 
imposing civil remedies and opening the judge up to liability would provide 
remedies for those who fell victim to a benchslap and deter future benchslaps. 
Despite this theoretical benefit, the costs of such a solution would easily outweigh 
whatever the benefits. While it would deter benchslaps, it is also likely that the 
solution would deter judges from playing their needed role in the attorney discipline 
process. Just the threat of litigation would be enough to lead most judges to conclude 
that it was much too risky to comment on an attorney’s conduct even in the most 
professional language and manner. To the extent that benchslaps erode public 
confidence, this solution also fails to correct the problem. Imagine the public’s 
reaction to regular lawsuits pitting judges and lawyers against each other. If our hope 
in eliminating the benchslap is to protect the judicial system and the self-regulated 
legal profession, civil liability kills the patient along with the aimed-at cancer. 
Another possible solution would be to leave the benchslaps as they are, but 
increase the due process rights associated with them by easing their appealability. 
While adopting an “always appealable” position would reintroduce basic notions of 
fairness, that solution fails as simultaneously too restrained and too aggressive. It is 
too restrained in that it would fail to address the basic flaws in using public shaming 
to regulate attorney conduct. Even if an appeal was successful in having the 
offending benchslap removed from the order or decision, it would come too late to 
correct the damage that was done. As in many things, the later retraction is never as 
widely published as the first filed scandalous story.308 The sensational benchslap and 
its initial publicity, rather than the reasoned decision on appeal, is what would be 
remembered. This solution also fails to address the basic inappropriateness of the 
benchslap as a response to attorney misconduct. Any proposed solution should 
reinforce and re-center the judiciary’s role in that process and not implicitly 
encourage judges to find and come up to the line that might trigger a successful 
appeal. Relying on busy intermediate courts, with their ever-growing dockets of 
mandatory appeals, to police and set standards for when lower court judges have 
gone too far is destined to fail. Such courts would have every incentive to set 
relatively low bars and permit lower court’s substantial latitude to continue current 
practices. Such a rule would be supported by the normal discretion allowed to lower 
courts to manage their proceedings and the appellate courts’ understandable effort 
to limit the impact on their dockets of a new flood of appeals, not from the parties 
																																								 																				
307 See generally Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying,” supra note 24, 
at 479 (arguing for the creation of “a statutory cause of action to give the bullied employee 
true legal recourse against the bully and his or her employer”). 
308 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (noting that “the truth 
rarely catches up with a lie”); Kehoe v. N.Y. Tribune, Inc., 229 A.D. 220, 223 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1930) (“Retractions are often dilatory, offensive, and ineffective.”). 
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but from lawyers unhappy with a judge’s conduct.309 Thus, this reform too is over 
aggressive. Like opening up judges to civil liability, relaxing appeal standards would 
generate more infighting between judges and lawyers in a forum that seems ill 
equipped to handle those disputes. Not only would the public’s confidence be shaken 
by such infighting, but the results would be constantly open to doubt. It would be all 
too easy to discount an appellate court denying a benchslap appeal as the court 
“protecting one of their own.” 
A final potential solution focuses on the judge’s ethical duty to report attorney 
misconduct. Such a reform would do away with the stair-step approach to mandatory 
reporting and replace it with a requirement that any potential violation, large or 
small, of the ethics rules must be reported to the proper authority for investigation. 
However, that reform too creates more problems than it would solve. First, it would 
convert judges from reasoned counselors on attorney conduct to hair-trigger 
tattletales. Such a result is neither necessary nor wanted. It would rob judges of one 
of their most effective tools of ensuring attorneys live up to the high standards of 
ethics and professionalism demanded of the practicing bar. The firm but professional 
conversation, the note suggesting how one might handle situations better in the 
future, mentoring relationships, and other aspects of private guidance and nudges to 
get attorneys back on the correct path would all be lost. In some sense, those tactics 
are private shaming strategies, as opposed to public ones. While eliminating the 
public shaming of the benchslap is a needed step, it need not and should not come 
at the expense of effective private ones.   
 
B.  Stopping the Slap Without Hamstringing the Judiciary: Strengthening Judicial 
Ethics Commissions to Punish and Deter Benchslaps 
 
Because a benchslap primarily raises ethical concerns—both of the attorney to 
whom it is directed and of the judge from whom it is issued—issues regarding their 
propriety should be decided by the current ethical enforcement institutions. Rather 
than taking the drastic step of either ignoring those issues (the status quo) or creating 
new remedial avenues as outlined above, we can strengthen the current system while 
making clear that a benchslap is inconsistent with a judge’s ethical obligations. Four 
																																								 																				
309 See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Egbarin, 767 A.2d 732, 783 (Conn. App. 
2001) (“[U]nless it clearly appears that [the attorney’s] rights have in some substantial way 
been denied him, the action of the court will not be set aside upon review.” (quoting 
Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Presnick, 577 A.2d 1054 (1990))); In re Craven, 1515 So.2d 
861, 865 (La. 1943) (“The court is concerned therefore solely with the disciplining of the 
defendant for his professional misconduct, as to which the court has a wide discretion.”); 
State v. Norton, 116 A.2d 635, 639 (Me. 1955) (“The conduct of attorneys in the course of a 
trial is at all times subject to proper regulation by the presiding judge, who has a wide 
discretion in this regard. Thus, it is for the judge to determine, in the exercise of his 
discretion, whether counsel has transgressed the bounds of professional duty . . . .” (quoting 
88 C.J.S. Trial § 158(b), p. 306))); Royal Indem. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St. 3d 31, 
35 (1986) (“A trial court has wide discretion in the exercise of its duty to supervise members 
of the bar appearing before it.”). 
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main reasons justify maintaining the basic structure while improving the guidance 
provided by the canons of judicial ethics. 
First, judicial ethics commissions already are experts in balancing the needs of 
the judiciary against the requirements of the canons of judicial ethics. Accordingly, 
from a judicial resources viewpoint, it makes little sense to ask appellate court judges 
on appeal or a trial court judge in a civil suit to assess whether a court’s order has 
crossed from stern rebuke to discourteous belittling. Further, this expertise with the 
canons of ethics would better equip the judicial ethics commissions to speedily and 
quietly dispose of frivolous complaints. That in turn would eliminate whatever 
incentives a lawyer might have to bring a complaint or file an appeal simply to harass 
or embarrass a judge in retribution for the commentary on the lawyer’s performance.   
Second, keeping issues regarding benchslaps with judicial ethics commissions 
would avoid the under-reporting problem that undercuts the self-policing of the legal 
profession.310 Lawyers are understandably apprehensive about filing complaints or 
appeals against a judge before whom they may appear in the future. Rather than 
passively waiting for attorney victims to file complaints that may never be filed, 
judicial discipline bodies could act sua sponte to address an indecorous benchslap. 
A judicial disciplinary body need only peruse one of the many legal blogs to see 
whether local judges have potentially violated their ethical obligations to take 
appropriate action when faced with attorney misconduct and to conduct their affairs 
with respect and courtesy.   
Third, judicial ethics commissions are better equipped to issue remedies that 
would both address the immediate concerns raised in the benchslap and ensure the 
integrity of the judiciary. The overriding goal in any judicial discipline case is not to 
punish the offending judge but to cleanse the judicial system of the blemish caused 
by the offending judge and to restore and preserve the integrity of the judiciary.311 
																																								 																				
310 Greenbaum, Automatic Reporting, supra note 204, at 440 (summarizing the reasons 
why judges and lawyers under report misconduct and noting that the “flexible standards” for 
reporting attorney misconduct is a “recipe for silence in many instances”). 
311 See Goodman, Causes of Judicial Misbehavior, supra note 9, at 976–78 (noting the 
goals of judicial discipline are most often described as maintaining “judicial independence,” 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and to “protect the public” from misbehaving judges). According 
to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court 
 
disciplines a judge not for purposes of vengeance or retribution, but to instruct the 
public and all judges of the importance of the function performed by judges in a 
free society. And it is one of the more important and difficult tasks we undertake. 
The goals of disciplining a judge in response to inappropriate conduct are to 
preserve the integrity of the judicial system as a whole and to provide reassurance 
that judicial misconduct will not be tolerated. The discipline imposed on a judge 
must be designed to announce publicly this court's recognition that there has been 
misconduct. And appropriate discipline should discourage others from engaging 
in similar conduct in the future. 
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Any remedy provided by the civil justice system would focus more on compensating 
the attorney rather than protecting the institution and the public. Conversely, judicial 
ethics commissions are nimbler in their range of potential remedies and have both 
the means and the incentive to impose more fully restorative remedies. For breaches 
that are less serious, a simple admonishment may do. Even for actions that may 
approach but not cross an ethical line, an ethics commission could warn the judge 
that similar conduct in the future may be treated differently. For particularly severe 
cases, a judicial ethics commission could recommend removal of the judge from the 
bench. Or, as Professor Goodman suggested, judicial disciplinary commissions 
could focus more on a restorative justice model and provide mechanisms to allow 
the judge to apologize and reconcile with the parties whom he or she offended.312 In 
this sense, the existing ethics enforcement mechanisms are the only ones able to 
balance the remedy to the severity of the problem, consider and remedy the damage 
to the institution of the judiciary, and remedy the most severe cases. 
Fourth, that nimbleness of remedies and focus on protecting the institution 
rather than the payment of damages would reduce any potential chilling effect that 
a more rigorous enforcement of the duties to report and of courtesy might create.313 
If the judges’ role in the enforcement of attorney ethical standards is to remain 
vibrant, then judges should not feel overly constrained in engaging in that role. 
Subjecting judges to civil remedies or costly appellate litigation whenever a lawyer 
feels aggrieved by a judge’s commentary on his or her performance would 
incentivize judges to refrain from commenting on attorneys’ work more than they 
are already. 
Yet, despite these four benefits, the fact remains that the current system of 
judicial ethical enforcement has proved either unwilling or unable to address the 
propriety of judges issuing benchslaps. It is without doubt that the judicial discipline 
system is in need of reform.314 However, the problem in the context of benchslaps is 
																																								 																				
In re Florom v. Florom, 784 N.W.2d 897, 904 (Neb. 2010) (citations omitted). See also In 
re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crivello, 564 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Wisc. 1997) 
(“In determining appropriate discipline to impose for Judge Crivello’s misconduct, we 
consider the purpose of judicial discipline — ‘to protect the court system and the public it 
serves from unacceptable judicial behavior.’” (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 608 (Wisc. 1989))).  
312 See Goodman, Causes of Judicial Misbehavior, supra note 9, at 989–92.  
313 See Lubet, supra note 9, at 1311 (noting that “[p]recipitous disciplinary action may 
also threaten judicial independence” but discounting that effect regarding discipline for 
“stupid judge tricks”). 
314 See Goodman, Causes of Judicial Misbehavior, supra note 9, at 952–56 (discussing 
the importance of regulating judicial rudeness); Maxine D. Goodman, Shame, Angry Judges, 
and the Social Media Effect, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 589, 591 (2014); Eric Dexheimer, Who’s 
Policing Texas Judges?, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 15, 2012, at A1; William Glaberson, 
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ZWNC]; Brian Rogers, Defense Lawyers Complain Judges Rarely Punished, HOUS. CHRON. 
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more basic—a total failure to engage that system regardless of its inherent flaws. 
Lawyers, judges, and judicial ethics commissions have failed to respond to 
benchslaps even when they are out in the open. Thus, Judge Posner’s pictorial 
benchslap goes uninvestigated. Judge Sparks’s invitation to a “kindergarten party” 
stands without a similar invitation to a judicial disciplinary hearing. However, 
modest modifications to the canons of judicial ethics would prod those parties into 
action while maintaining the benefits of the current ethics enforcement regime.315 
To that end, I suggest two additional comments to the canons of judicial ethics 
to make clear that the kind of written orders described here represent breaches of the 
judges’ ethical obligations. First, Model Rule of Judicial Ethics 2.8 regarding 
judicial decorum and demeanor should include a new comment 4 making plain to 
judges and judicial ethics commissions that: “While judges have substantial 
discretion in the contents of their written orders and decisions, the inclusion of 
language that would reasonably demean, belittle, or bully an attorney, litigant, or 
other person appearing before the court is inconsistent with a judge’s ethical 
obligation to be ‘patient, dignified, and courteous.’” Second, Model Rule of Judicial 
Ethics 2.15 regarding a judge’s duty to take appropriate action when faced with 
lawyer misconduct should include further language at the end of existing comment 
2 making clear that: “Under no circumstances would it be appropriate for a judge to 
belittle, demean, or bully a lawyer in a written decision or order (whether published 
or unpublished) as a means of addressing potential or actual attorney misconduct.” 
Obviously, the existing language in Rules 2.8 and 2.15 and the commentary 
thereto are insufficient to produce the needed enforcement. However, given the 
benefits of the current system we should take whatever measures necessary to clarify 
the application of those rules to judicial benchslaps. By doing so, we can eliminate 
the role of the judicial bully. However, by retaining and strengthening the existing 
flexibility that judges have to address attorney ethical and professional breaches, we 
also need not convert every judge into a tattletale. Instead, this added commentary 
leaves in place a judge’s discretion to report attorney misconduct to the bar and 
removes from the judge the authority to address attorney misconduct through the 
public shaming of a benchslap. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
In his book, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, 
Professor John Mueller makes a distinction between options that are “rationally 
																																								 																				
(Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Disciplining-Texas-
judges-can-be-a-balancing-act-3004058.php [https://perma.cc/YZH7-S5AD].   
315 Professor Greenbaum argues in the context of judicial reporting of attorney 
misconduct that clearer guidelines for reporting would result in judges complying with that 
obligation despite their apparent reluctance to do so under the current guidance. See 
Greenbaum, Automatic Reporting, supra note 205, at 440; Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting, 
supra note 5, at 545–51. 
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unthinkable” and those that are “subrationally unthinkable.”316 Options that are 
“rationally unthinkable” appear on the list of options but are ultimately rejected by 
a decision maker because they are “determine[d] . . . to be unwise after mulling [it] 
over.”317 An option only becomes truly obsolete when it is “subrationally 
unthinkable”—when it “never percolates into their consciousness as something that 
is available.”318 This Article posits that issuing a benchslap should, at least for now, 
be rationally unthinkable. The suggested revisions to the ABA’s Canons of Judicial 
Conduct achieve that goal by causing judges to think twice before issuing such 
demeaning and belittling orders. While a judge may consider penning a benchslap, 
hopefully, after reflecting on the strengthened canons, the judge will reject that 
option and find a more helpful and less destructive way of addressing the attorney’s 
conduct. Eventually, taking such action should become truly obsolete. Like the art 
of dueling is no longer considered to be a valid method of restoring one’s besmirched 
honor,319 so too should issuing a benchslap simply fall off the judge’s menu of 
options in favor of better, more constructive alternatives—alternatives that honor, 
rather than demean, the judge’s important role in the self-policing of the legal 
profession. 
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